Art after theory
Part 4 Running away from the text….




This text now opens itself into a space which was already present, and we do not decide on some object, even the impossibility of an object, this is not considered. The text is distributed, is formed by the thought, and distributed by the thought, altered by the thought, in this way and not a formative critique of the thought, it does not formulate the thought, the thought persists as something undefined by the text, and so the text does not define even itself.

Now this de-ontologizes but as yet we have no subject , we borrow - an object, in our case 'art', and place it into our subject as the intention of the thoughts content not its intention. We can say more - that this resembles a problem, but one without a solution or the desire of a solution. One again can generalize a metaphysics of sorts from this, of the sort which changes itself into not just a multiplicity, but a process, a number of parallel events rather than a singularity.
we can regard history as being absent, as if it is present its present as something which prevents history.



The actuality, of this intention without an object, or objectivity, perhaps is present as it changes, not in a state change, but rather in the sense of a changing state, one that is never static, and so never one, a none state, before it becomes useful, the activity of this intention, not its object its destination, but the word itself must be altered to reverse its direction to the changing nature it can hold or express, which it is given, to which it pulls away from, doesn’t hold but handle, altering and so is a good word to use here. We say it behaves eventually like an object, but we must not fail to engage even in the impossibility of the object, which we are pressured already to leave our original thought, that which made the art is removed, absented for something other, a thing of truth, and of value. /or other such mythic / idealities- the whole materialist - determinist value system is based on this fallacy, the value of anything including the object itself, it is that there always has been the alternative to the production of the object of value, the uncompleted intention, the actuality of the act becoming something else, never being itself, (a denial of ontologisms ontology- leaving ontology static for a moment!- though perhaps we shouldn’t - firstly a denial is used as an alternative which has to not see its other for a moment in order to generate itself, into a being, which is both a thing and a becoming) which is to the word an act of freedom and creation, something new, a creation which continually creates itself, yet never achieves this, leaving the space for its and anything others, future. (time here can be thought of the present’s movement towards not being here, without this failure of ontology and existence nothing would exist) the art act, this act represents an instantiation of this.
and successfully now - the immediacy not its instantiated object - there is no object- It is both closed off on its own and yet produces, is the act of producing the next process, otherwise nothing including the art - would exist, art's production here is always guaranteed, but always objectless, still to gain a value, always possible. What is produced is different- only by virtue of a conceptualizing it as an object, as such it can gain a value, and this is a description of something other than this, which is then open to deconstruction, philosophizing, critically evaluation and comodification etc.




On method- as historically text structuralizes thought, the avoidance of thinking in a certain way becomes the avoidance of writing as representation, our problem then is best expressed in writing, can only be expressed as both being complex, deferred, unstable, and present in its activity which leaves an unstable mark, in writings uncertainty and complexity. This is not to engage in the meaning of writing but the meaning of thought, the thinking of thought, as an opened meaning of the prior graphical, objective thought, the problem of meaning is not the problem of knowing what one means, this knowledge is always a postori and closes the activity of thought, and so we use meaning in a way more than its historical sense, keeping its historic sense but bringing to it the history of consciousness and its presence, of thought before the event, and not as yet some idea or episteme, and specifically in cases where this involves the presence of ethical and aesthetic consciousness then this is what I will call art.

We then push words - with all they still have and are, into a space on which they need to work harder than before, we overload them now with our self, in this creative, and not created space which is always new, we allow them to become creative, this creation must also now be new, as we are, be new, the word must first uncreate itself to begin to express itself, and through this our self, the presence of itself, first disappears, is disappearing, is a presence , this presence a disappearing of itself, before someone, me, names it, and so before I name anything, even myself.



(Lets write towards this, this referent, without violence that wishes to establish a permanence which prevents this.)

(The purpose of this is subordinate. Too simple to be pragmatic or symbolic on some other text, or thing. )

Writing has always been about something written or something other - not of itself, but of the referent of this presence. Not a description, words, or a description of itself, as text. Or what text is. What then is this referent, open, lacking in violence of presence, giving in to itself and anything other. This referent is that which denies itself to itself and so is the prime cause. That is in simple naming and complex metaphysics .

(Language's presence and permanence is a presence, as is all objects, including art objects - even when they do not signify a referent they offer a pretence of objective presence , permanent presence. )

Is a thought reciting, or has it a dynamic before the confrontation with the idea of an object, before it can be referred to. And how is it to be referred to, how is it, its status to be treated, sustained, in the past it was convenient to replace it with a sign. And this is not to recourse to emotive gestures, but complex dynamic systems, a language must be as subtle as this. We have written out simplistic objects and now we are re-writing writing.
There are two sources of instability, one logo-philosophical the other aesthetic-ethic, of consciousness. From the later we do not create or judge objects but create the spaces for itself, its presence in whatever form, or not. This space has a structure which is ontologically missing, absent, not even deferred- or is it in anyway transcendental. It feels incomplete which may provoke an activity towards it which is destructive - and contrary to what is provoked. That is its representation must be in a shifting - a moving- which is possible only now in a certain linguistic light. Literature is fixed and so cannot move in this space. Philosophy destroys it - yet there is nothing philosophically mysterious, imaginary, arbitrary about it, its ethics are our ethics its aesthetic the same, of what could be called instability, the mutability of consciousness in the first case, its move towards something in the second, a move towards a lie, all texts lie.

The need to be positive imposes new tasks on words. One is certain of this incompleteness, because of the impossibility of completion, without completing something else which is then lost to us.



Reading Nietzsche as a paradigm for reading art as language- or art as text -etc.

Reading Nietzsche and relying on a reading, what reading is, in the sense of partial reading or to ask the question how could it be a complete reading, and as to where the contradiction is, where the error is, there, not if any at all, or in here, by recourse to itself, not a recourse to Nietzsche’s, then one can ask, who or what is one reading, and how, and why. How does one deal with such supposed dual, or multiplicity of readings, and potential readings. I'm not answering such a question, in any case a dealing with... is, if not impossible certainly unlikely, so we are left with writing? Potentially difficult in its sense of motivation regarding the empty tautological space - spaces? which are provided. If as we say a contradiction occurs, which is wrong, we invoke a reading of language which might well reduce to either tautologies or contradictions, how then is our reading a reading of anything at all. So if we want to read anything, read in a different way, to a fixing on some contradiction whoever is writing or reading, but to engaging with them, which is very much what I at least would wish to do, as for Nietzsche, the development of his apparent contradictions, though I have tried to point to these, I would not mind playing a further part in whatever activity might take place around them, though this is perhaps a philosophical task, or a task of literary criticism.. for myself however their role is essential in both destabilizing the text, is part of a programme of writing before the logical framework, which is perhaps philosophy, or the end of art, the root of the idea. Around this disruption, which is yet to have a static object to disrupt, this is a site which interests me. We arrive disrupted, confused, yet these words - like all , work backwards from an idea of objectivity- only in some senses- which is an idea of language, and logic. Which places us back with the unspeakable, empty, diseased view of philosophy, metaphysics and questions of art. Not at ease, this is though the artistic condition as a disease, unease, which is to be dealt with, hidden, not -solved by the writing, as important, whether it be good or bad, and the same could be said of speech, yet both are obviously empty- in themselves. They too quickly replace the disease, the disruption with an empty promise. The text disrupts the subject with its objectivity at the cost of this subjective space, at the cost of the subject’s subject ,if this is declined, refused, and silence not entered into, there is something significant here, it is the opening of the text to thought, and thought to the text. Opening up of thought to itself, like an embrace. The embrace that both signifies and is its own subject, we are left with the feeling which language now embraces before a textual problem a problem opens itself to the idea of problem, and the idea of problem to the problem itself, which is present. The referent. Now why is it that the problems idea is hostile towards its referent, is all language the same. Behind this inscribed hostility is a person, who wishes to naturally overpower.




Iconographical metaphysics - here, is a picture of a desired impossibility, it is opaque, which in its desirability, unachangability is a metaphysical 'idea' or picture, the desire, the lack in metaphysics of the cosmos, a lack for the impossible, the incompleteness of that which cannot be complete, not of the created impossible idea, but that being is disrupted not by itself, is itself disruption, desire of desire in our terms, the aporia of language, a priori, the limit to being and knowledge which is indefinable, that which language attempts - is a non-existent ideality, which as the immediate presentation of the present avoids the nihilism of the eternal return of the same's non-teleological presence.

If the a priori of this text is not (significantly or is) its subject , as of all texts? and the problematics relating to textuality, the nature of the text but not the texts subject and the subject has a content that normalized grammars will not see it, other than perhaps a set of statements which can appear contradictory, it is both behind and before the writing and not here present in whatever form we consider, is not here a consideration, here it is a mistake, one of many ,'these are never articulated, in the subject, but if at all in the event, this event, which follows the falsification of content and meaning.' Art - or anything other than language, only if we consider that language stands outside its description, or otherwise we need to re cast the text towards its subject at the expense of its guarantees given above, at the expense of being what it has become. This subject itself being free of such guarantees, or systems, or yet to establish any, its pre-established state is not a consequence of its yet to be, or may be, or becoming, or eventuality, if we consider consequences in a particular way, non historical associations for instance. Lets try to be positive, my difficulty of naming is that the arrival of a name legitimates certain moves, rather perhaps there should be a list of names, for no other reason other than a psychological economy, at this instance, which is itself economic , movement, opening, longing, waiting, yet to begin, even in phenomenology the subjectivity of a certain presence which appears before the presence, its presence, preventing the beginning of phenomenology itself, until the activity of phenomenology or anything else takes place and objectifies - or attempts to, de subjectifies at least, fails to ground, yet provides a ground. The subject is represented by a state, a feeling which is a presence which was once established as some movement towards an object, as here it is also. This writing in itself now becomes a movement towards the subjective subject and not a description , or critique, deconstruction etc of it. It then becomes of itself a subject which destabilizes itself, and then moves before this, stepping outside of its own constraints, if it could step, and here it attempts, falsely a signification.









But the call to the thing itself is at the same time directed against historicism, which gets lost in treatises about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of types of philosophical world views - as already noted, neither have we committed this time / structure to be linear, branching, dense or discrete etc. The answer to the pseudo-metaphysical question is not that we must revise these restrictions so as to provide for such cases, some poststructuralist semiotics as social semiotics are concerned with signifying practices in specific social contexts but we employ modalities in doing the former, of course, in what was called abstraction, in which we are aware of the difference between the modalities but we do not isolate them.
Much as we would make much of this agreement to write as an end in itself, even calling it one of the few unanimous decisions we took, and given the above analysis of the conclusion of transcendental deduction, which demonstrates that all synthesis is subject to the categories, it is puzzling to find for instance Kant claiming that the unity of formal intuition precedes all concepts, yet presupposes a synthesis. In the (new) Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes all concepts, although it indeed presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, but through which all concepts first become possible. We have little interest in modern metaphysics which regards itself with respect to the new absolutes of foundationialism and tries by means of this, its own grounding, to integrate the other sciences , philosphies etc. as a pre-ontological knowledge according to its own standards of truth; or the opposite case, the modern philosophies, theories etc which makes of themselves absolute foundations and, if need be, appropriates elements of metaphysics according to its own methodology by this process the whole as such, surveying its entire content, itself emerges out of this wealth wherein its process of reflection seemed to be lost.

In the light of such conclusions, our question is not fundamentally about the certainty of knowledge, signs, symbols, speech and writing on the basis of the, states, affections and what holds for consciousness, that holds here for so called subjective existence in general. On the contrary, we understand ideas primarily in the act of using them; reflective, theoretical awareness of them as distinct, extant things which develop from these, after all, would be quite possible in view of the difficulty of effecting a transition from metaphysics to another kind of thinking.
It is often very difficult to be able to decide what predicates are to be taken as primitives and which are to be defined via suitable nominal definitions outside of metaphysics yet inside art, nothing like what is called the explanation of the manner in which a priori concepts which can relate to objects.

Connections with intuitionistic’s were noticed early on and toposes are still used to investigate models of various aspects of intuitionis, instead of the inner activity and self, movement of its own actual intention, such a simple determination of direct intuition, Anschauung which means here sense, knowledge is predicated in accordance with a superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is a false construction.
There has been a strong though by no means unanimous trend in development of such conceptualism, when new techniques for understanding art were supposedly being developed and that understanding itself was being transformed! (sic)
Kant described what this in effect was as the relationship between the critique of reason and the science of metaphysics which has to be grounded anew by means of the concept of transcendental philosophy: I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects, Kant did not demand that one completely do without these instruments in philosophical knowledge, but that one should become aware of their specific difference of performance in the respective knowledge of the object.
In particular, it will be useful to see whether this sort of objection is involved in anything which would follow from the truth the universality of the phenomenological epoche as practiced by the phenomenologist qua artist - non conceptually, from the very beginning the universality in which he or she becomes the totality of his/her conscious life, processes bring about not only a thematic purification of the individual processes of consciousness and thereby discloses its noematic components; it further directs itself on the intemtions of consciousness, which it frees of everything concretely conceptual.
Similarly, because of this hostility to empirical research and deductive logics of post -modernity.

The fundamental meaning of exactness in this lies in its being founded on an a priori formal system each part unfolded in a special theory similar to pure geometry, a theory of pure concept, theory of idea, etc for a hermeneutics described as a condition, at the outset as the unbreachable basis for its method: an alienation between the physical and the natural. (The argument in the foregoing paragraph rested on the idea that if any two sentences mean the same, then they are about the same things- and this is in effect challenged.)
In contrast to these codes, these non codes are structurally simpler, not employing standard conventions and formulas , so they can generate cliches and stereotypes brought to stand in being called to cast itself as self in one of its possibilities of existing and committing itself to a draft of itself .

The empirical does not allow for the evaluation of normative claims especially if its own is a separate point from the critique of the general importance of certainty and control in The New Art, thus, even though Derrida can say that diffrance is the condition of possibility for presence, he will not permit this term to be recuperated and thence become the site of origin itself - this has an obvious importance to us here. Now how do things stand in relation to this subjectivity? Modern theories of self, organization phenomena have several roots which did look for control hierarchies, but we quickly see more complex behavior that opposed the reductionism of the modern, universal as metaphysics, distinguishing itself from the traditional principles first fundamentally in regard to this methodology- if it should so be called. It recognizes its self, a reflective function of its self, examination for the relative realization of the correlative practical idea of sense, whose structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, it recognizes its self, reflective function for the relative realization of the correlative practical idea of a second sense, whose structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, namely as one consciously and purposively directed towards this absolute idea.

From premises of that kind it is or might be concluded that real thought in fact took other forms and was governed by other laws than those that this current logic considered the sole determinations of intention. For example, on one reading of the following sentences.
1:Theory is a victim especially of this misunderstanding because, apart from refusing to shift from the metaphysics of subjectivity to a consideration of being as being, it adamantly insists on a fundamental drafting of being as egoistic, ie as an egoistic subject, into which it then introduces the imperative, absolute ethics of the other.
2: Everything that was discussible has been discussed; this is true is no longer
in order to express the occurrence of events, but we use events to express that events occurs over time.


But this- either - is not enough, and such a definition/s is merely nominal, which do you like most, which enjoys a clear syntax and a precise semantics compared to some existing representative reified temporal systems such as those of the following analysis which would have to thoroughly investigate as claims to have disentangled logic from ontology, an investigation I’m unequipped to carry out at this point.

All imaginative synthesis is not subject to theory- or theory of theories, and this presumably includes whatever synthetic components are inherent in mere thought - regarding internal categories, we are growing increasingly aware that the top layer is a context which is extremely difficult to handle, roughly speaking a model of a theory may be defined and used as a possible realization in which all valid sentences of the theory are satisfied and a possible realization of the theory is an entity of the appropriate set theoretical structure etc. but now we find that this in our case simply wont do. The definiteness and anaphoricness of it in induces a sort of familiarity effect.


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