Work from 1973-2000 (fragments)

 

A-N  Towards Art and Language as  "in the last analysis"[Writing] does not give rise to a hermeneutic deciphering, to the decoding of a meaning or truth.

 

A

If the a priori of  this text is not  (significantly or is) its subject , as of all texts?  and the problematics relating to textuality, the nature of the text but not the texts subject and the subject has a content that normalized grammars will not see it, other than perhaps a set of statements which can appear contradictory, it is both behind and before the writing and not here present in whatever form we consider, is not here a consideration, here it is a  mistake, one of many ,'these are never articulated, in the subject, but if at all in the event, this event, which follows the falsification of content and meaning.' Art - or anything other than language, only if we consider that language stands outside its description,  or otherwise we need to re cast the text towards its subject at the expense of its guarantees given above, at the expense of being what it has become. This subject itself being free of such guarantees, or systems, or yet to establish any, its pre-established state is not a consequence of its yet to be, or may be, or becoming, or eventuality, if we consider consequences in a particular way, non historical associations for instance.  Lets try to be positive, my  difficulty of naming is that the arrival of a name legitimates certain moves, rather perhaps there should be a list of names, for no other reason other than a psychological economy, at this instance, which is itself economic , movement, opening, longing, waiting, yet to begin,  even in phenomenology the subjectivity of a certain presence which  appears before  the presence, its presence, preventing the beginning of phenomenology itself, until the activity of phenomenology or anything else takes place and objectifies - or attempts to, de subjectifies at least, fails to ground, yet provides a ground.   The subject is represented by a state, a feeling which is a presence which was once established as some movement towards an object, as here it is also. This writing in itself now becomes a movement towards the subjective subject and not a description , or critique, deconstruction etc of it. It then becomes of itself a subject which destabilizes itself, and then moves before this, stepping outside of its own constraints, if it could step, and here it attempts, falsely a signification.

 

B

 

Iconographical metaphysics - here, is a picture of a desired impossibility, it is opaque,  which in its desirability, unachangability is a metaphysical 'idea' or picture, the desire, the lack in metaphysics of the cosmos, a lack for the impossible, the incompleteness of that which cannot be complete, not of the created impossible idea, but that being is disrupted not by itself, is itself disruption, desire of desire in our terms,  the aporia of language, a priori, the limit to being and knowledge which is indefinable, that which  language attempts - is a non-existent ideality, which as  the immediate presentation of the present   avoids the nihilism of the eternal return of the same's  non-teleological  presence.

 

 

C

 

Reading Nietzsche as a paradigm for reading art as language- or art as text -etc.

 

Reading Nietzsche and relying on a reading, what reading is, in the sense of partial reading or to ask the question how could it be a  complete reading, and as to where the contradiction is, where the error is, there, not if any at all, or in here, by recourse to itself, not a recourse to Nietzsche’s, then one can ask, who or what is one reading, and how, and why. How does one deal with such supposed dual, or multiplicity of  readings, and potential readings. I'm not answering such a question, in any case a dealing with... is, if not impossible  certainly unlikely, so  we are left with writing?  Potentially difficult in its sense of motivation regarding the empty tautological space - spaces? which are provided. If as we say a contradiction occurs, which is wrong, we invoke a reading of language which might well reduce to either tautologies or contradictions, how then is our reading a reading of anything at all. So if we want to read anything, read in a different way, to a fixing on some contradiction whoever is writing or reading, but  to engaging with them, which is very much what I at least would wish to do, as for Nietzsche, the development of his apparent contradictions, though I have tried to point to these, I would not mind playing a further part in whatever activity might take place around them, though  this is perhaps a philosophical task, or a task of literary criticism..  for myself however their role is essential in both destabilizing the text, is part of a  programme of writing before the logical framework, which is perhaps philosophy, or the end of art, the root of the idea. Around this disruption, which is yet to have a static object to disrupt, this is a site which interests me. We arrive disrupted, confused, yet these words - like all , work backwards from an idea of objectivity- only in some senses-  which is an idea of language,  and logic. Which places us back with the unspeakable, empty, diseased view of philosophy, metaphysics and questions of art. Not at ease, this is though the artistic condition as a disease, unease, which is to be dealt with, hidden, not -solved by the  writing, as important,  whether it be good or bad, and  the same could be said of speech, yet both are obviously empty- in themselves. They too quickly replace the disease, the disruption with an empty promise. The text  disrupts the subject with its objectivity at  the cost of this subjective space, at the cost of the subject’s subject ,if this is declined,  refused, and silence not entered into,  there is something significant here, it is  the opening of the text to thought, and thought to the text. Opening up of thought to itself, like an embrace. The embrace that both signifies and is its own subject, we are left with the feeling which language now embraces before a textual problem a problem opens itself to the idea of problem, and the idea of problem to the problem itself, which is present. The referent. Now why is it that the problems idea is hostile towards its referent, is all language the same. Behind this inscribed hostility is a person, who wishes to naturally overpower.

 

 

D

(Lets write towards this, this referent, without violence that wishes to establish a permanence which prevents this.)

 

(The purpose of this is subordinate. Too simple to be pragmatic or symbolic on some other text, or thing. )

 

Writing has always been about something written or something other - not of itself, but of the referent of this presence. Not a description, words, or a description of itself, as text. Or what text is. What then is this referent, open, lacking in violence of presence, giving in to itself and anything other. This referent is that which denies itself to itself and so is the prime cause. That is in simple naming and complex metaphysics .

 

(Language's presence and permanence is  a presence, as is all objects, including art objects - even when they do not signify a referent they offer a pretence of objective presence , permanent presence. )

 

Is a thought reciting, or has it a dynamic before the confrontation with the idea of an object, before it can be referred to. And how is it to be referred to, how is it, its status to be treated, sustained, in the past it was convenient to replace it with a sign.  And this is not to recourse to emotive gestures, but complex dynamic systems, a language must be as subtle as this. We have written out simplistic objects and now we are re-writing writing.

There are two sources of instability, one logo-philosophical the other aesthetic-ethic, of consciousness. From the later we do not create or judge objects but create the spaces for itself, its presence in whatever form, or not.   This space has a structure which is ontologically missing, absent, not even deferred- or is it in anyway transcendental. It feels incomplete which may provoke an activity towards it which is destructive - and contrary to what is provoked. That is its representation must be in a shifting - a moving- which is possible only now in a certain linguistic light. Literature is fixed and so cannot move in this space. Philosophy destroys it - yet there is nothing philosophically mysterious, imaginary, arbitrary about it, its ethics are our ethics its aesthetic the same, of what could be called instability, the mutability of consciousness in the first case, its move towards something in the second, a move towards a lie, all texts lie.

 

The need to be positive imposes new tasks on words. One is certain of this incompleteness, because of the impossibility of completion, without completing something else which is then lost to us.

E

On method.

As historically text structuralizes thought, the avoidance of thinking in a certain way becomes  the avoidance of writing  as representation,  our problem then is best expressed in writing, can only be expressed as both being complex, deferred, unstable, and present in its activity which leaves an unstable mark,  in writings uncertainty and complexity. This is not to engage in the meaning of writing  but the meaning of thought, the thinking of thought,  as an opened meaning of the prior graphical, objective thought, the problem of meaning is not the problem of knowing what one means, this knowledge is always a postori and closes the activity of thought, and so we  use meaning  in a way more than its  historical sense, keeping its historic sense but bringing to it the history of consciousness and its presence, of thought before the event, and not as yet some idea or episteme,  and specifically in cases where this involves the presence of ethical and aesthetic consciousness then this is what I will  call  art.

 

We then push words - with all they still have and are, into a space on which they need to work harder than before, we overload them now with our self,  in this creative, and not created space which is always new, we allow them to become creative, this  creation must also now be new, as we are, be new, the word must first uncreate itself to begin to express itself, and through this our self,  the presence of itself, first disappears, is disappearing, is a presence , this presence a disappearing of itself, before someone, me, names it, and so before I name anything, even myself.

 

 

 

F

The actuality, of this intention without an object, or objectivity, perhaps  is present as it changes, not in a state change, but rather in the sense of a changing state, one that is never static, and so never one, a none state, before it becomes useful, the activity of this intention, not its object its destination, but the word itself must be altered to reverse its direction to the changing nature it can hold or express, which it is given, to which it  pulls away from, doesn’t hold but handle, altering and   so is a good word to use here. We say it behaves eventually like an object, but we must not fail to engage even in the impossibility of the object, which we are pressured already to leave our original thought, that which made the art is removed, absented for something other, a thing of truth, and  of value. /or other such mythic / idealities- the whole materialist - determinist  value system is based on this fallacy,  the value of anything including the object itself, it is that there always has been the alternative to the production of the object of value, the uncompleted intention, the actuality of the act becoming something else, never being itself, (a denial of ontologisms ontology- leaving ontology static for a moment!- though perhaps we shouldn’t - firstly a denial  is used as an alternative which has to not see its other for a moment  in order to generate itself, into a being, which is both a thing and a becoming) which is to the word an act of freedom and creation, something new, a creation which continually creates itself, yet never achieves this, leaving the space for its and anything others, future. (time here can be thought of  the present’s movement towards not being here, without this failure of ontology and  existence  nothing would exist) the art act, this act represents an instantiation of this.

 and successfully now - the immediacy not its instantiated object - there is no object- It is both closed off on its own and yet produces, is the act of producing the next process, otherwise nothing including the art - would exist, art's production here is always guaranteed, but always objectless, still to gain a value, always possible.  What is produced is different- only by virtue of a conceptualizing it as an object, as such it can gain a value, and this is a description of something other than this, which is then open to deconstruction, philosophizing, critically evaluation and comodification etc.

G

 

this text now opens itself into a space which was already present,  and we do not decide on some object, even the impossibility of an object, this is not considered.  The text is distributed, is formed by the thought, and distributed by the thought, altered by the thought, in this way and not a formative critique of the thought, it does not formulate the thought, the thought persists as something undefined by the text, and so the text does not define even itself.

 

Now this de-ontologizes but as yet we have no subject , we borrow - an object, in our case 'art', and place it into our subject as the intention of the thoughts content not its intention. We can say more - that this resembles a problem, but one without a solution or the desire of a solution. One again can generalize a metaphysics of sorts from this, of the sort which changes itself into not just a multiplicity, but a process, a number of parallel events rather than a singularity.

we can regard history as being absent, as if it is present its present as something which prevents history.

 

H

 

"Why a text of a particular subject would need to be seen as being empty is in order not to have a reflexive permanent content or even one which is or can be regarded in the light of future textual analysis. "

 

within this, our practice the text will always be open to its particular subject and in order to do so will need to empty itself, or maybe at least to a hostile reader appear to do so! - to be an abstract  class  for the subjects world space, it cannot then be either public,  or static, which would remove, or allow removal, modification etc. of its particular instantiation , and so allow further reuse, reevaluation, interpretation , analysis and deconstruction- of its content - world space, and not just its abstract methods (there are non), as seen here.   That the class, this class, container is deconstructable doesn’t effect the subject which is now separated to what might appear logically to have generated it, though in our case this reversed, logically or gramatologicaly, though not in the non history - pre history of the subjective phenomenon, the source of the text  becomes a instantiation which is hidden to the empty generative class and others which it creates,  which even generates itself, and as such can take part in a history of analysis etc. as well as safely  instantiating its subject, to the extent that the subject is allowed to be itself, regarding itself as an instantiation of its own life world not determined by external logics, grammar, rules bases etc. For instance in relation to its class which it generates and which is so a generative class itself, of itself and others.

 

 

The nature of this class and its supposed inheritance and types in the subjective post- theoretical text is reversed, however this in an anti histro-ontological sense must also at some point have been or is the case. The move from subject - object - subjects- is its product, and here the original subject's content is removed or hidden to a critical or hostile reader. It is therefore not the case of demanding specifics if this is only in order to remove them - modify etc. we have placed a special signification in the instant, and one we have said is problematic, and here formally problematic, one then cannot be  describable. Such descriptions are other objects, real objects, non problematic in form, in logic, in reality, in metaphysics, maybe, but our initial problematics form, here in this, can  derive a class, narrative etc.-  a generalized class, but not one capable  of producing   a critique of it, from some external and therefore illegality, or open it to illegal alteration etc, or even create it, as a text. The point here is the abstract nature of our subjects types of problematic.

 

The properties of these subjective classes, methods etc, is that they can have, and do have multiple different instances with their own life worlds unlike some universal overarching, and legitimizing, limiting , class or narrative i.e. a determinist object, typical of modernity.

I

A brief note to begin..

 

where or when such things developed is an historical interest- morphology, overloading- or hiding of the object, in theory - the synthetic productions of extreme parallelism   et al. are historical events within some structure - both- all- generated out of a particular instantiation- and not of a class, or culture, as a  productive, pragmatic , capitalist  move- the devolvement of hierarchies -  networks  of various and varying topologies, being actively open to historicizing or being regarded as ontologically present in the past or present or not...-etc. There is yet to be information- this is defined from instances  in the form of generalizations, which produces symbols, signs,  language, formality  and images, tautologies logics,  aesthetic screens and finally in this process, this list, epistemologies etc. which is an attempt at a formal generalization- of a 'metaphysical' instance. Such a description in itself could be constructed by reference to an instance- in fact all such generalizations need to be made specific with regard to their genesis, and seen therefore less than they actually appear,   language needs to degeneralize itself and rediscover its subject. Otherwise it becomes a legal instrument for the prevention of genesis. - life - experience- process creativity etc.

 

 

J

 

'or should we consider art as a private language '

 

Essentially there is only one listener.

 

Who is it that listens and why, it might be said we listen to familiarize the self - lets compare this to game playing, entertainment or education, having 'pet' theories, and detailed knowledge of given facts. If we wish to explore truth, and thought, and why should we, what would be wrong in not doing so, - we need not to direct thought and consciousness at its own instability but use this as a method of experience of the general….,  in any private language, a private language as language without a reader, the excuse for such thinking would validate itself now, which it does so, must do, the compromise occurs only in simple social communications - which legitimate the power of the word, sign, over the signified individual.

 

Given a reader what we then explore are the limits of communication at its most abstract, any audience revolves around the prospects of fascism, and these problematics - socio-economic -cultural. etc.

Removing these - we still are faced with the continuing problem - that is what as I can I do, and what difference this makes, what difference anything makes in some teleology.

 

 Which is a solution to the working out of the problematic, far from being a sterile phenomenon it is productive, unlike the socio-artistic-conceptualist -etc which inevitably after failing logically - implicit or explicitly- abandons meaning for elegance.

The movement has been to amalgamate the synthetic in avoidance of the logical object to subjective narration, avoiding  the hierarchies of questioning which supposed an answer, but a narration of the many problematics - which is both art and the life-world - cosmos,

avoiding metaphysics and such nonsense, which then is not complete but a mark, signification etc. but narration is only an excuse here at signifying the proto-world before objects, which is hidden by the sediments of language, logic and meaning, and against a belief in such devices with their teleological implications.

 

 

K

 

'That nothing makes a difference.'

 

 We do not need to consider the so called objects of communication in art which  fail to make a difference to the psychological being of the phenomenological presence of what has been called the iconography of art - before its logos - and neither the appearances, images, texts grammars etc. - after the epoche - which is after this moment, - we would say prior to perception- are differences seen- these objects fail to difference consciousness- the phenomenology of being - present in the subjective subject which- this - we call here art,  - rather  the logical structures have been seen both in short terms and in its histories to change - and so articulate - signify - in this subjective revealing of their fictions as objects of the conscious field,  of developing an ontology, in which case we see ontologies as pseudo-ontologies as subjects of private iconographies - which appear never to change.

 

We can as what others have called the / what we would like to call deep/ phenomenological epoche before sign and signifier - before ontology and metaphysics, history etc, this  landscape of the particular before its actual description - before it particularizes itself - or is made into an event -  as it in it's self consciousness is always identical - with itself- always different to anything else- even when it is an historical event - of remembering, could be considered as a iconographic act, it is - here called art - but elsewhere philosophy etc. and we might consider such an answer to be that its presence is not iconographically opaque - but resides as a universal potential.

 

This  is not  a drawn description, it is not a history, not a raw phenomenon , and that then goes for any signification, beyond the subjects subject - as art which could be described not in morphological terms - reusing the language of morphology etc, but in a new language which could be thought of as art as i.e. non signified private language activity- or not - but something far wider - far more complex.

 

L

 

We have described the position regarding logics before the epoche in the phenomenological event as being absent and non foundational, and the dangerous consequences of theory, the old syntactic and semantic rules etc., the use of which is so fatal to subjects which could be described as being empty ,i.e. the history of art and language. With the - so called - but not- empty subjective space the free play can and does allow in certain circumstances - i.e. performative acts etc. - the 'whatever it means to you is what it means' approach, typically cited in  post-modernity, which occurs for what may be a number of reasons, which  however is not a singular approach  if we regard the  ethics which are in very simple terms present  in the very act of intentionality,  seeing, destabilization, instability, phenomenological presence, as  presence of a wish or desire ,want, need, etc.

We are then in being honest open to judgment, and in turn offering judgment which communicates prior to meaning and theory etc, prior to symbolic evaluation,  which is a significant externality, as well as an internality and such judgments being ethically based are free of tautology, are flexible, unstable themselves, which is here  a good, not a bad thing. We can now see how fixed rules, old syntactic and semantic rules, etc, simply wont do in regards to the world.  The alternative pragmatic free play - anywhere- but especially throughout all of what is called post modernity is essentially hedonistic, the 'whatever it means to you is what it means' of post-modernity, is hedonistic. In placing ethics before this, it forces a limit on the pragmatic and opens a space in the hedonistic pragmatic field in which once again perhaps we can communicate, that is recognize the difference, the instabilities, between others but primarily first in establishing ourselves, as subjective, dynamic entities, and so remember and so avoid the downside of the 'whatever it means to you is what it means',  a kind of eventual chaos from which one is unable to escape, to the extent that even the subject becomes lost. There can be no art here even as absence, (want, need, etc which elsewhere is called instability) for what may or may not be possible, as even when non realization is concrete the wish, desire etc, is effectively dealt with by the propositions of pragmatism.

The morality of intention, position, description, state, desire, wish  etc, without which it  wouldn’t be is yet another parallel thread.

i should note - though personally there is no need- that the status of "can",  is sufficient, a possibility is sufficient, as even its provisional state attributes itself, this problem then doesn’t arise, the pragmatic response if it chooses, is to ignore this, to completely remove it, and so effectively remove everything,  and this is why Post-modernity is amoral,  it seeks stability and attempts to fix itself, even in its free play. This ethics arises from this, lack of permanent presence, intention, position, description, state, desire, instability, wish  etc. ,it is there,  as an ethics, a morality, but one which is self aware.

 

 Does this then impose itself on us. i don’t think it does - for then it would destroy this, its own  instability .This morality is from outside. The best name.. A society - is this? .. It is irrelevant to ...the actuality of each day, each deconstruction, lack of permanent presence,   etc.

Any text tries to stabilize this  instability and so it is not ethical, as is any text which opens itself to free play etc.  Meaning, answers, questions, provide solutions and these are not moral  activities. You can not do anything with this given instability. It destabilizes itself yet fails to remove itself - replaces itself with something else which is itself unstable, incapable of Becoming form, as each form materializes it remains, as an instability.

 

 

 

 

The problem of art is not simple, simplistic notions just wont do. The phenomenological activity, the epoche, is internal and in all cases is yet to open itself to logic, or philosophical problemizing, it is then a complex problem. It is a problem of intention. To intend to problematize is the causality of modernity, within our work now there is no causality, there is non i think generally in phenomenology anyway. The intention and the problem coexist, in a manner which is not causual, non teleological.  The coexistence outside of causality avoids the conclusion of an object. Such complex parallism avoids the lack of dimensionalities of logic. But this is getting prescriptive or descriptive of the very unfixed problematic state. We do not need to use words in new ways. We need to avoid prescriptive logics and clever tricks. External ideas. we are still in the wrong mental set, still looking

 

but what we can do is a decisive step away from even intention and problem, otherwise we are bound to these by some causal logic, some ethics of empiricism, of phenomenologisism.

 

And here we can as it were we use language differently.

 

 

 

 

intentionality  is  the product of a primitive instability. It follows  that all texts are provisionally unstable.  what is it then which singles this out. Firstly its reluctance to take this on, secondly its own intention as an intention. This looks like tautology, but it isn’t in that it distances itself from itself and differentiates itself from itself.

 

The moment of recognition of the problematic of distancing in intention is a phenomenological event before the decisive act, which in this case apriori will not become decisive, the decision is this recognition of what becomes, what always is unrecognizable what is not accurately casually describable.

 

I can see a potential criticism in a lack of difference, and such a problematic might be considered as a new subject, a good thing , a new source of discussion, however its really a kind of metaphysical criticism, and we are operating beneath this, before it. And so the first answer, a metaphysical answer, is that  we are not doing metaphysics, though there might Be an analogous opportunity in metaphysics. There are I think  however  other answers which do not  depend on any metaphysical critique.

 

I suppose a logical one is simply that we will only find identity in an ideality,

and we are seeing the destabilization  of our intention as not a consequence of our intentionality towards an ideality but as a deliberate act, of a phenomenological epoche which subjectively is always different.

The refusal to give in to logical  difference, or not, is a refusal to engage with the metaphysics of logic or the logic of logic.

 

There are others, from elsewhere we know that the play of difference  de stabilizes a status quo, the signified , the  signifier is the play of difference.

That  identicalities are,  is an aporia,

The identity of indecernables maybe like wise and the contradictions of the eternal return etc.  Our difference however lies in the relation of our problematic towards itself, firstly recognizing it as described as an internal destabilizing source and so deliberately before this logical - empirical destabilization takes place, intending a prior   destabilization as a phenomenological intention, and  this has to Be different. even before logic establishes its difference, or the phenomenological realization does as we intended it in the first place, destabilization is  always present, always different.  If it were not then we have an ideality, which is firstly impossible, but more importantly not wanted, not present, as its presence would remove the problematic.   That is the old mistake.

 

 

 

The space in which this specific language describes its subject is uncertain, as is the ability for any descriptive process to take place. This was termed our problem, and by others seen as a final act of some reductionist step. The examination or re-examination of such texts is another activity in its self.   A text may have to have a subject - a pre text - and yet in itself can develop other subjects, this is where we might differentiate ourselves from some deconstructionist program of making something new. Our pre textual intention is art as not a reductive questioning, which borrows much from analytical philosophy, but as a destabilizing process, recognizing  itself and it simultaneous subject.  the goal here is not an ontological destabilization, and not the destabilizing of something, anything else. Its  fairly obvious why this should be so, the move towards abstraction is as good an example as any where Destabilizing the ontology may well be seen as the problematic. Or in conceptualism... But as soon as we realize the problematic the artwork is realized and completed. Yet a repetition or copy of this work is no longer considered art  is perhaps the result of the removal of the problematic and not the primacy of a solution. The primacy of solution paradigm was effectively removed by the failure or success of conceptualism which in effect nullified the idea of art. It became an ideality.  Anyway without the problematics of art there would be no art.  This very thing is after all what we want, what the whole thing is about. The insight is sufficient to see how then it is possible to continue. Historically but not presently  Each time we find a problem it is a case or possible site for how we deal with its actuality. Modernism mistakenly attempted an analysis , a kind of enlightenment ethic, one in which understanding mapped the limits of the cosmos, we could do art, the evidence of this is still in the museums. A conceptual critique of this only refined art into the problem of art to be dealt with. Not other problems for Intentional activities do not occupy physical spaces and problems within them are not concepts or theory. We do not have to prove our questioning here, or is it an empty question, remember we had an intention, a motive for doing this.  This problem may well be an indication of the scale, an infinite scale, of the difference between the ideality and the intention. I am not concerned with the ontology of the ideality, or any special supposition which we can place in the most pessimistic of places, but with the danger of some self satisfied description. This simply will not do, is disrupted by all kinds of externalities, but the artistic move here is our intention to disrupt it ourselves. Or better at the same time finding this.. Ontology, of any kind, has absolutely nothing to do with art from our point of view, as an artist.  The phenomenology  of the question -not  why we question - is the artistic act.  The question has a content not based around this ideality of art and our attitude towards it, it is there already fully developed. Our attitude towards it is not as an ideality, we simply cant compare, it's another’s problem, with no stable epistemological framework, no doubt as serious a problem as ours is. The framework itself  appears as a transcendental question. And this is wrong from an art practice point of view, it must be reversed,  we are again attempting to say something about art as ideality, yet  what is actually happening is something to do with our intentionality, it's the cause of our problem, its obvious that it is, we feel it so.  There could be all kinds of reasons for these problems, as exposed by analysis, philosophy etc. and there might in principle be a way of dealing with them, from outside, or we could simply  pragmatically ignore them, but here is our move as artist, we want a particular problem to be a phenomenological instance, we intended this to be so. Any acceptance stops our activity.  There is no need to underline this act as a kind of objective framing. All previous ideas of transcendence, overcoming, re-stating, refining, making, etc are not questioned, but the intentionality is so framed as to open itself to itself , and not some other problem. That is our aim is not an arbitrary questioning or revision, our aim moves no further than itself as question. This is a very particular kind of question empty of any content except itself, and that is why it cant be answered and that is why is can be validated if it needs to be. Each time the moment of this question is realized we have another site for an art work. It is never though some intention at ideality, it has been realized in post-reductionism terms that it is itself which is the only possibility.

 

 

 

Intentionalities may be regarded as some objective ideality, but I would  not like to do so here. There is no value in this, what I want is not a foundation building exercise, this quickly looks like tautology if it keeps to some set of consistent rules. This new space is uncertain, the process disruptive. And neither do we want imaginary objects, if everything is provisional then its that which we need to destabilize. It appears I am doing something I cant do, not just setting up things to be knocked down or are we  making progressive systems.

 

Language is once again at the service of experience, and not supplying any donotic insight or bags of rules. The mistaken confusion was elaborated so that the method became the arbiter, the confusion was and is real, the problematic also, and the interplay between the various significant systems something quite other, the problematic is both pre and post linguistics, things like meaning and use. The awareness of the problematic was never intended first as being useful, it is after all a morphological feature in the past. How meaning, words, work here is radicalized and not random. Syntactically if allowed to run its course language eventually  empties itself. But these problematic of meaning exposed the remaining phenomenology of the real, and what well call the intentional subjective problematic of art, once the structures of meaning in language are removed. That is this is not a question but the presence of absence, elsewhere described as instability, absence of ideality, recognition of the possible presence of an ideality yet still intending it. The criteria for impossibility and contradiction being removed not by the failure of language but by the continuation of our wish to hold on to this unresolved, unresolveable....  A captured image of a movement which removes itself in its movement.

 

We have moved beyond process of destabilization as casual intentionality into actual destabilization as an apriori. So we have removed the worry of what to do, the difficulty of what to do, causality is planning  and planning gives rise to causality, and causality gives rise to objects, whether material or not as signifiers of something which cannot be signified, in a field of truth mapped by untruths.

 

Language as meaning is only one object among others, and meaning is a finality. An excuse.  The reuse of it in evidencing these unstable phenomenologisims  could be described as representing a new abstraction of representationalism. It is then seen philosophically, where old philosophy looked for meaning and stability, as negative phenomenology, a negative philosophy though not anti-philosophical.

The philosophical here is used as another analogy of what we are doing. We talk about the problems of philosophy , the problems of art, as something to be solved, something to be dealt with, yet the word arises after the fact and logic after the word...

This is not to dismiss logic or language as a pragmatic structure. No matter how well it accounts something remains which is not a wish, romantic, mystical presence, but can be  described as a  problematic presence towards which  our intentionality   can not causally be placed.  They remain layered together outside of a, the,  sentence with absent ideality etc etc, in no conceptual chain. The problematic destabilizing itself, its ontology, its epistemology, etc etc. . After all surely it must do that.

 

 

 

Intentionality and the exposure of is problematic could be described as a descriptive attempt which does not engage in art activity, but this is a naive approach, if the activity was to set itself as  the area for the problem to exist in it would play a role.

 

 

 

However when we focus on this problem we see it is not a problem at all in any ordinary sense.  Or is it a casual process. Now I am not  engaging in a kind of metaphysics about this non objective non subjective intended, having dismissed the ideality as an impossible intention, it is no longer the impossibility of the intention towards an ideality which is a cause of failure. Only historically. An historical naivety which is beside the point, we cant really say anything like this, as its about this that  we do not concern ourselves without concerning ourselves with  ontology. Or are we drawing up lists, we are engaging in the actual activity of an intention towards art. Other things of course appear, we are not naive purists, or boring tautologists. Or can we abstract some kind of formulae- such as ……... Its not a question of epistemology. There is neither a multiplicity or a singularity. This not  a pre chaotic state of undifferentiates which appears post analytically, but the result of an intentional act towards a ideality. Not (a subjectification of the object or attempt at objectivity, the ideal remains an impossibility, the subjective remains as a totality. But there is no point to this. We have chaos- subjectivity, pragmatics, wishful thinking, and the impossible idealality. We regard the ideality as a site of failure of both subject, and  object. However we are not bothered with (this) failure.

 

 The event around idealities and language, of pragmatics and their limits regarding idealities has first pragmatically removed idealities from consideration by some, but by others placed them in an unreachable location, and importantly opened up the ground between the absolute of the ideality and the pragmatics of the subject. This has to be a generalized ground at its limits- at the ideal, but between such convergent idealities we have an intentional space which can have titles such as art  philosophy science , mathematics  etc. The intentionality moves us from the pragmatics of a null subjectivity into this field. There is no reason for this to be a negative field but we need to be aware of the nature of this fields instability, it is essentially unstable, neither a subjective pragmatic, which can be fixed, a decision, or an actual impossible ideality. The metaphysics of this instability is interesting but surely it is undecideable as to their causalities. 

 

What we have are  the intentional spaces which we have described above, spaces which are essentially unlimited.

 

It now requires us to see how such essentialities can themselves be destabilized, are destabilizing. This is relatively simple, an simple intentionality will do.

 

 

 

Elsewhere texts have attempted   a critical and positive step from  a multiplicity of possibilities- which are not considered as objects, writing, communications, internalities, and  these texts have exposed these themes. To re-examine these would be like going backwards to synthesize an object out of its fragments. But already we have fallen victim to objectivity. What we have discovered  as essential is a critical subjectivity of destabilization.  Superficially it  might be difficult to see anything wrong with this , however in not  doing so we might be seen to be   replacing  its move, one of destabilization with another objectivity, or attempted objectivity, or illusion of an objectivity. We might once again find ourselves in a determinist descriptive world trying to do things such as figure out what art is.

the powerful lessons learnt, the significant discoveries of the absence of the art object was a reductionism and objective fact. Its the nature of this fact which can despite its apparent negativity ensure the very thing we want. A destabilizing activity, a subjectivity attaching itself to subjectivity in order to objectify itself.  The condition of pseudo theories such as other texts, is such that they can appear to objectify themselves  in order to be effective and so their very success is a  failure. Inhibiting other texts, and being essentially now a dead object. Such writing as other art before, essentially closes down everything. And we can dream up any number of sentences of the kind which point things out , even negatively. Self destabilization might be thought to be an ideal, but only in the sense that idealities are simply not allowed. A trite recourse to failed idealities misplaces or replaces the dynamics of non textual, non prescriptive discussion, activities etc. That something is said actualizes a destabilizing feature is only a logical and not artistic process. That offering meaning or abdicating it is also I think wrong. To ask What are your intentions is the response to this,  intetionalization cuts things off, stops them straight away, what things of course, neither. Both. Not neither but not in some middle ground, there has to be a radical use of language here which avoids certain placements, maybe all placements.

To cite something else is a grounding and therefore a bad move, a halting move. What’s wrong then is this, this very agreement.

 

We should not cite the...  as pun on site. There is no site. Neither is there a non-site.  Such sentences are difficult and potentially dangerous. We  need something not closed off, open , dynamic, non coding in a fixed way. The very play of codability non codabilty is not our business, it is just that we find this is a potential problem in misunderstanding the kind of structure we have, and how the word structure is being used.   perhaps  It is the non objectivity of the texts focus and not the texts non objectivity, disability, which is important. Any textual disability is besides the point. The real de-stability here - is here already, and wanted , but here already.. There are numerous things of uncertainty here. Intention, reality, subject, aporia of action. We break open the question, we don’t question it in some hall of mirrors fashion, or  remove it. We have radicalized the geography of the sentence and its causal chains, as they are responsible for placing stability as a universal.  and we are then in this new place. Such a position has no relation to an object, is neither   outside or inside the object, the object becomes not unbounded but its boundaries are no longer  binding.  It is the essential activity which only appears contradictory if we regard words such as ‘problem’ as meaning something quite specific, i.e. Not problematic. This fault is to be sorted out elsewhere,  but here it does not name but  generates the problem as itself.  The record of this, the reading of this is  not a de coding , problem to solution, which implies a set possibilities of success, yet the success of this here now has been assured in its own intention , and its own uncertainty is the guarantee and proof.  We move on to uncertainty and intention.

 

 

 

 

 

From a causal point of view and ignoring (I can I think borrow a term here - under erasure)  both matter, and media* , we can move on to examine  the play of logic and meaning, and here we can question meaning as it relates to  art, or, and art practice , we should return to this and or.... what occurs ……  here at this point  is a splitting, as opposed to a synthesis, (a very non dialectical move, an alternative dialectical move subsumes everything into the absolute...There art and every specificity disappears ) and at such a split the opportunity to move in two directions occurs, we have choice rather than a synthesis, yet perhaps only one of these can now  validate the artist and art.  .. Only one of these non synthetic choices is now - has now become - or is becoming - the artistic move. A separating out of a particular intention.    (Later and elsewhere the meaning of meaning is itself split, deconstructed, etc.) What is left on the other side of our question of the meaning of art from the question of meaning  could be called a place for art activity to take place. Is always the place it takes place. A conditional hiving off is a disruptive destabilizing activity in which where the one side relates to a move towards art is questionably art, the other to other objects etc.  We pursue , now  historically, the process through ontology towards a negativity, but this too can be destabilized, fragmented, questioned. And again a split occurs and a choice has to be made. This now appears like an endless and logical causal chain, it is perhaps the play of logic into meaninglessness,  an exposure of meanings inability to mean anything- even nothing- a metaphysics of nothing, and or a metaphysical failure, it is always attempting to capture what is outside, and  a decisive choice here has to be based on our initial and continued intention- and it this in causal terms which is what accounts for its non-philosophical move, away from problems of being - Metaphysics etc

A move which was not a move but an exposure of what was already present, and the intentionality which remains in this presence. I would call this a non pragmatic move as it does not any longer have any ideas about solutions.

 

 In this non pragmatic move into a space outside of pure subjectivity? Or not -  in the senses or arbitrariness,  pure objectivity or intentional objectivity,  we do not become involved in philosophy, even a radical philosophy - a philosophy which perhaps can also occupy  such a space, or become involved with trivial objects. Dead cows for instance.  I  make these points here to avoid any confusion as to what we are doing or better intending,; intention is here may well be crucial.

 

Where we are now is beyond the word itself as something stable,  and beyond the instabilities which Modernity either failed to deal with, or discovered, such as how things and substances differentiate themselves,  that there is here a particular thing before its name could be particularized. How this coalesced how it can be de- coalesced, and through ideas  of  instability  in  communication taking place, how these are questioned etc. Therefore the position of the word the text, the before or after the word as something definite, we do not single out, or use this as a critique or a methodology or better an intentionality that we already had,   this itself, is now not as it was, an imaging, a means of producing a  set of propositions.

 

 

 Numerous structures now disappear, which can be, have and are being  critically considered, this as opposed to a negation, a negative reductionist move, there dissapperance leaves a presence. (Without meaning, meaningless too disappears, nihilism is the product, a result of logic.)

 

The ideas that are  essentially  against this negative, reductionist move need not be followed, we can consider these structuralist, outside art with their own problematics.   If we consider all reductionist moves might arrive at dead ends, they destabilize reading and logic, and this removes them, does  not put them under erasure, regarding art activity, the move in art which apparently arrived at  a dead end, is removed. This is one removal, from outside. The second more radical removal  is internal and simply rejects reductionisms conclusion, after allowing it, on the empirical evidence, there is something still present. Even if it were not we could intend it.   what was exposed in reductionism was a displacement of idealities, now the location of these may be  regarded as  a dead end   if one regards the absolute ideality as a possible reality, or as achievable, but now its removal or arrival has not removed our intention or ability to do so. Its removal, or arrival has made it possible to defend ourselves from being called unreasonable, or meaningless, as in it total presence there is something else, or a possible intention, and in its absence there is a presence or possible intention. 

 

And so we have a very limited  pretext in which to work, because of the removal of certain spaces, structures, logics et al.  Spaces  between perfect - (and non realizable) idealities, and complete but pragmatic subjectivities.

 

  Any number of destabilizing texts may appear, and appear possible and  we can admire these, appreciate these but we are now as it were underneath them. They are destabilized by our intention - which we now see which is neither pragmatically fixed or ideally fixed.  The very failure of modernity  which produced such an instability such un certainty gave us a methodology - and importantly showed an alternative,  perhaps in its own confusion gave us the opportunity to see that the problematic of art remained, and we wanted it to remain, we actually liked and like it.

 

  As for the pragmatics of stabilization, justification within post-modernism, these old forms are ok, they have in the face of the destabilization chose to ignore what was empirically exposed, which I think  in effect has been to ignore art as an intentional activity. 

It may be a legitimate move to not become involved in other activities - but certainly if we avoid the problematics regarding art, we avoid art altogether.

 

 

*This ignoring is a token for a complex activity of analysis perhaps best regarded from other disciplines. The term is not pejorative either externally or internally. But importantly we are not ignoring our particular intentionality.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Any text sets out to say something in a certain denotative way must be suspect with regards to art activity.

We do not want to talk about the problematics of text, or texts, here. Art has consistently  refused to engage in the problematics of any given text, theme or subject. In particular it seems to locate only to draw attention to what it is not, only to displace these objects, text or not. From an art point of view the textual  structures like any other structures are of no concern in themselves, in their histories, this is  even at the extreme of ignoring the truth, or radically not having any serious regard for  the technicalities of any science, semiotics etc, such as even the status of the signifier and the signified. Their relationships, status, histories etc. This is why I have said elsewhere we have in comparison a radicalization of the use of language. However the text here, is not through   its formalities  in error regarding art, its error must be elsewhere, actually in its stability. This does not mean that the textual move was a mistake, those who have called such a move a blind alley were I think mistaken.  It was the only possible route away from the physical object art object paradigm. The so called failure in textuality was in a way to be expected the same kind of thing happened elsewhere when chasing such absolutes. So also To engage in semantic meaning, or nonsense, or poetics is mistaken even if it is not a blind alley, as is analysis of any kind whatever, psychological, philosophical, metaphysical etc.

Formally the texts records - badly - but its the best we can do - the art practice, its properties then are irrelevant, relevant is, or better was,   the ability to pose in text a question. Distinguishing itself as text was  irrelevant to art, so text is mere pragmatics, and that is why it becomes radicalized. What can be said as a detailed  questioning, critical, responsive process etc cannot   be achieved in other media, where we see the - you see what you want attitude regarding   gallery objects, the gallery  situation was  only ever a very primitive formal presentation of completed stable objects. The objects here are closed, anthropomorphically dead, and speechless. But another possibility is that of speech, the relationship of text to speech need not concern us - in the face of other media the questions that are raised are phonetic, whether speech or writing, it is the structural purpose as use which was important and still is, that is significant in pushing the problematic of art further, we could look at the question, the thought, But not to- again- question its process but to show its failure. to phrase this positively, this becomes what art is, as seen, experienced.

 

 

 

the radicalization of  this language is the result of the radicalization of the art activity,

 How is it that idealities became  a problem is resolved in their position as problems. Art - as art may  function as some semiotic / philosophic or pseudo-philosophic tool, whatever art as art means,  outside yet defending this tendency and such an activity might  be  socially very useful,  but  so might be our radicalization. we are after all trying. Whatever, I am not heading towards some wonderful derridaian autonomy, even if , and I doubt it, it happens. Ones own psychological position is difficult; which is symptomatic but in no way conclusive. Whatever. Is it like this or like that, whatever, it is specific. And here is something someone might say is an original and positive statement. Although specification is kind of boundary drawing. We must move on. we must avoid solutions, why?  Why cant these equally become radicalized. This after all could be called a solution.  this activity - which is art - is fundamentally illuminating in the nature of things. It might from outside validate  its morphology.

 

So if we are not satisfied with this, how psychologically fatal this would be.

 

 

 

"doubt can  exist only where a question exists"  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

 

Firstly and historically, 'art' is the instability of its own definition, the instability of its signifier and the instability of its signified. Secondly art in late modernism - in conceptualism,  is the instability of the ideas around its ontology.. Whether this reflects a cultural, philosophical , biological , or even cosmological - metaphysical - fact, is besides the point from an art point of view. The artist engages in the instability, is its actor. The mistake, and part of the de-stabilization , is looking for final definitions. And of course now here is such a mistake. But allusions to philosophy -biology - history - art history - culture - parody - humor - politics are  even more besides the point. we do not define either negatively or positively, but create the instability, or rather point it out in the now present, now present text. This text's status as art is (then) essentially unstable?

Critically we are  caught between logical certainties and methodologies - we note Nietzsche - heidegger and derrida's challenges, questioning of truth, logocentricism et al. - or something nonsensical, even poetic.

 

That there is a general epistemological instability is interesting,(outside or above and so inclusive of art), if art was to be descriptive it would certainly define this general - philosophical- metaphysical instability - elsewhere called deconstruction. I might even criticize the term if I was not principally interested here  in art, and not here! interested in philosophy, ontology etc..  The prima-facie case I will go on to make isn't the historical instability but the inherent instability here now, and the nature of this, its proper naming, or inability to do so.  The status of this work as art does not lie in its willingness to be uncertain, unstable, any critical position is in itself challengeable, I could imbed such a challenge here, but that it attempts to indicate that the problematic remains no matter what. Why this defacto or de jour cannot be realized is obvious- though maybe it should be re stated, its restatement can again be challenged. Remember Russell's  remarks regarding the tractatus - it throws up an uncertainty as to truth. Yet here we don’t even have any given criteria  as to the significance of truth, or whatever. We are left with the art and its ontology   having a greater uncertainty, instability - if you like than philosophy, in Russell's sense, but perhaps not elsewhere. However its only psychologically reassuring to find oneself in company, there is no internal assurance as to right or wrong. Both absolute positions and any other are questionable. And so on and so on.

 

Perhaps at this point we need to say more about materials, however such a discussion would be a kind of anthropological investigation, texts as signs are simple in pragmatic terms. Specifically its the conceptual instability and not the physical instability which makes us artists and not physicists, galleries and objects represent places for the physics of instability to be demonstrated. And  restoration does not restore art back to the object. so I would consider the method of writing firstly as pragmatic, though there are difficulties with this, in how we write, with regard to meaning as expressed in language as being casual or logical, problems with the idea of equivalents etc.

 

The legitimating of the art practice has to be in the first place with the artist,  how do you know you are doing art unless you are questioning the activity , other wise you are probably  doing something quite different and allowing some external definition- and so some external person as  artist.

modern day impressionist painters are painters, modern day conceptualists are conceptualists

 

so we need to reject the idea of concept as art, but still  accept the discussion. The Judd dictum about anyone calling anything art is an excellent example. It relates to a specific historical destabilizing, and the product of a new- and Judd’s- position, which is a new definition, or art object. Its truth or not is not as important as the ability to take up views about it. That is destabilize its objectivity. In a way he doesn’t know what he is talking about.

 The recognition here is that we cant get answers which are in anyway fixed. Consumerism maybe demands a pragmatic art, and that has been typical of post-modernism but in our definition it isn’t art at all, as its taken the pragmatic step of making a decision, it enters the gallery- or re-enters- and so there is nothing more to be said , nothing more to see, nothing more to do, the artistic move here was - if any - the moment of curatorial decision, however in reality the curatorial position has already presupposed art and its objects.  One does not re-discover America these days. One might discover something of it, but any object based curatorial or artist- move is now about objects, and I include concepts, politics, feminism, et al. And others. In other words not art. As artists brought in by questioning other things, so they are excluded - or else everything is included.  the point of the pragmatic inclusive decision is we then have to either discuss it or not. The objects then are if we do, clearly not the same, we then maybe wish to back down from this position, but again so long as we are doing the thinking its us that is realizing the art. The object once this process is over returns to it original and pre-artistic state. Just as in aestheticism, once no longer beautiful the object returns to its original state. Once the Beautiful is separated from art by a questioning process, a raising of doubt in modernity of the qualification of a objects properties as art we move to other considerations. However even when the aesthetic was concerned as being an attribute its nature was also unstable. The de-stabilizing of the material object-art paradigm  was the achievement of conceptualism.

 

This was only one in a series of destabilizations, of representation, of subject, of content etc which was modernity.

Conceptualists first engaged with the concept as object.  Objectivity followed  to a collapse in the ability to find a stable conceptual object at all. All this is history, and as such Belongs in a museum. The move was not made in which  Not the concept as object but concept as process before the object was arrived at. Such a destination is of course outside of art, which explains why it was avoided.  

But the alternative seemed to put an end to any activity at all, other than subjective and empty gesture. However if the radical move was made and the subjectivity of post modernity’s rush to make objects, again, is avoided we are not, as it was thought left with nothing, left with nothing to do. In removing the historical edifice of modernity we actually do expose something. At the very minimum a space for intentionality, which is not the excuse for objects.

 

The destabilizing process at this point does not collapse into nothing, for the same reason as the removal of a philosophical system does not remove its cause, there was a cause and before this cause gained its causality a presence, and in the absence of a presence the space for an intention.  The failure of a logical system due to internal inconsistencies does not necessarily remove the reasons , the intentions for its use, and these need not be some other inconsistency. Logical, metaphysical, biological, cosmological etc. Its possible still to want to do something and until we say what it is we cant say its a mistake.

 

 

 

'Generalizations -in art and philosophy'  where we can refer to 'this'. and not a specific- and this is maybe sufficient, so  sufficient then that specific disciplines, activities and subjects must too be generalized. Intentionally - is a modified metaphysics, a modified process or even a modified theology, we are in effect dealing with de-polymorphic activities, pre conceptual attitudes

 etc. - before specifics- is an interesting area in which to be. /sic/

Missing - this- as in a consideration of non presence and the need to now show that we can avoid missing premises is a possible tactic of both this activity and its simultaneous writing. These become specifics in themselves, and not dialectical subjects / objects/ we are not interested in dialectics.

 

 

'That nothing makes a difference.' - we do not need to consider the so called objects of communication in art which  fail to make a difference to the psychological being of the phenomenological presence of what has been called the iconography of art - before its logos - and neither the appearances, images, texts grammars etc. - after the epoche - which is after this moment, - we would say prior to perception- are differences seen- these objects fail to difference consciousness- the phenomenology of being - present in the subjective subject which- this - we call here art,  - rather  the logical structures have been seen both in short terms and in its histories to change - and so articulate - signify - in this subjective revealing of their fictions as objects of the conscious field,  of developing an ontology, in which case we see ontologies as pseudo-ontologies as subjects of private iconographies - which appear never to change.

 

We can as what others have called the / what we would like to call deep/ phenomenological epoche before sign and signifier - before ontology and metaphysics, history etc, this  landscape of the particular before its actual description - before it particularizes itself - or is made into an event -  as it in it's self consciousness is always identical - with itself- always different to anything else- even when it is an historical event - of remembering, could be considered as a iconographic act, it is - here called art - but elsewhere philosophy etc. and we might consider such an answer to be that its presence is not iconographically opaque - but resides as a universal potential.

 

This  is not  a drawn description, it is not a history, not a raw phenomenon , and that then goes for any signification, beyond the subjects subject - as art which could be described not in morphological terms - reusing the language of morphology etc, but in a new language which could be thought of as art as i.e. non signified private language activity- or not - but something far wider - far more complex.

 

 

 

 

'or should we consider art as a private language '

 

Essentially there is only one listener.

 

Who is it that listens and why, it might be said we listen to familiarize the self - lets compare this to game playing, entertainment or education, having 'pet' theories, and detailed knowledge of given facts. If we wish to explore truth, and thought, and why should we, what would be wrong in not doing so, - we need not to direct thought and consciousness at its own instability but use this as a method of experience of the general….,  in any private language, a private language as language without a reader, the excuse for such thinking would validate itself now, which it does so, must do, the compromise occurs only in simple social communications - which legitimate the power of the word, sign, over the signified individual.

 

Given a reader what we then explore are the limits of communication at its most abstract, any audience revolves around the prospects of fascism, and these problematics - socio-economic -cultural. etc.

Removing these - we still are faced with the continuing problem - that is what as I can I do, and what difference this makes, what difference anything makes in some teleology.

 

 Which is a solution to the working out of the problematic, far from being a sterile phenomenon it is productive, unlike the socio-artistic-conceptualist -etc which inevitably after failing logically - implicit or explicitly- abandons meaning for elegance.

The movement has been to amalgamate the synthetic in avoidance of the logical object to subjective narration, avoiding  the hierarchies of questioning which supposed an answer, but a narration of the many problematics - which is both art and the life-world - cosmos,

avoiding metaphysics and such nonsense, which then is not complete but a mark, signification etc. but narration is only an excuse here at signifying the proto-world before objects, which is hidden by the sediments of language, logic and meaning, and against a belief in such devices with their teleological implications.

 

 

Where we might have said….A brief note to begin.. where or when such things developed is an historical interest- morphology, overloading- or hiding of the object, in theory - the synthetic productions of extreme parallelism   et al. are historical events within some structure - both- all- generated out of a particular instantiation- and not of a class, or culture, as a  productive, pragmatic , capitalist  move- the devolvement of hierarchies -  networks  of various and varying topologies, being actively open to historicizing or being regarded as ontologically present in the past or present or not...-etc. There is yet to be information- this is defined from instances  in the form of generalizations, which produces symbols, signs,  language, formality  and images, tautologies logics,  aesthetic screens and finally in this process, this list, epistemologies etc. which is an attempt at a formal generalization- of a 'metaphysical' instance. Such a description in itself could be constructed by reference to an instance- in fact all such generalizations need to be made specific with regard to their genesis, and seen therefore less than they actually appear,   language needs to degeneralize itself and rediscover its subject. Otherwise it becomes a legal instrument for the prevention of genesis. - life - experience- process creativity etc.

 

 

"Why a text of a particular subject would need to be seen as being empty is in order not to have a reflexive permanent content or even one which is or can be regarded in the light of future textual analysis. "

 

within this, our practice the text will always be open to its particular subject and in order to do so will need to empty itself, or maybe at least to a hostile reader appear to do so! - to be an abstract  class  for the subjects world space, it cannot then be either public,  or static, which would remove, or allow removal, modification etc. of its particular instantiation , and so allow further reuse, reevaluation, interpretation , analysis and deconstruction- of its content - world space, and not just its abstract methods (there are non), as seen here.   That the class, this class, container is deconstructable doesn’t effect the subject which is now separated to what might appear logically to have generated it, though in our case this reversed, logically or gramatologicaly, though not in the non history - pre history of the subjective phenomenon, the source of the text  becomes a instantiation which is hidden to the empty generative class and others which it creates,  which even generates itself, and as such can take part in a history of analysis etc. as well as safely  instantiating its subject, to the extent that the subject is allowed to be itself, regarding itself as an instantiation of its own life world not determined by external logics, grammar, rules bases etc. For instance in relation to its class which it generates and which is so a generative class itself, of itself and others.

 

 

The nature of this class and its supposed inheritance and types in the subjective post- theoretical text is reversed, however this in an anti histro-ontological sense must also at some point have been or is the case. The move from subject - object - subjects- is its product, and here the original subject's content is removed or hidden to a critical or hostile reader. It is therefore not the case of demanding specifics if this is only in order to remove them - modify etc. we have placed a special signification in the instant, and one we have said is problematic, and here formally problematic, one then cannot be  describable. Such descriptions are other objects, real objects, non problematic in form, in logic, in reality, in metaphysics, maybe, but our initial problematics form, here in this, can  derive a class, narrative etc.-  a generalized class, but not one capable  of producing   a critique of it, from some external and therefore illegality, or open it to illegal alteration etc, or even create it, as a text. The point here is the abstract nature of our subjects types of problematic.

 

The properties of these subjective classes, methods etc, is that they can have, and do have multiple different instances with their own life worlds unlike some universal overarching, and legitimizing, limiting , class or narrative i.e. a determinist object, typical of modernity.

 

 

 

 

this text now opens itself into a space which was already present,  and we do not decide on some object, even the impossibility of an object, this is not considered.  The text is distributed, is formed by the thought, and distributed by the thought, altered by the thought, in this way and not a formative critique of the thought, it does not formulate the thought, the thought persists as something undefined by the text, and so the text does not define even itself.

 

Now this de-ontologizes but as yet we have no subject , we borrow - an object, in our case 'art', and place it into our subject as the intention of the thoughts content not its intention. We can say more - that this resembles a problem, but one without a solution or the desire of a solution. One again can generalize a metaphysics of sorts from this, of the sort which changes itself into not just a multiplicity, but a process, a number of parallel events rather than a singularity.

we can regard history as being absent, as if it is present its present as something which prevents history.

 

 

 

The actuality, of this intention without an object, or objectivity, perhaps  is present as it changes, not in a state change, but rather in the sense of a changing state, one that is never static, and so never one, a none state, before it becomes useful, the activity of this intention, not its object its destination, but the word itself must be altered to reverse its direction to the changing nature it can hold or express, which it is given, to which it  pulls away from, doesn’t hold but handle, altering and   so is a good word to use here. We say it behaves eventually like an object, but we must not fail to engage even in the impossibility of the object, which we are pressured already to leave our original thought, that which made the art is removed, absented for something other, a thing of truth, and  of value. /or other such mythic / idealities- the whole materialist - determinist  value system is based on this fallacy,  the value of anything including the object itself, it is that there always has been the alternative to the production of the object of value, the uncompleted intention, the actuality of the act becoming something else, never being itself, (a denial of ontologisms ontology- leaving ontology static for a moment!- though perhaps we shouldn’t - firstly a denial  is used as an alternative which has to not see its other for a moment  in order to generate itself, into a being, which is both a thing and a becoming) which is to the word an act of freedom and creation, something new, a creation which continually creates itself, yet never achieves this, leaving the space for its and anything others, future. (time here can be thought of  the present’s movement towards not being here, without this failure of ontology and  existence  nothing would exist) the art act, this act represents an instantiation of this.

 and successfully now - the immediacy not its instantiated object - there is no object- It is both closed off on its own and yet produces, is the act of producing the next process, otherwise nothing including the art - would exist, art's production here is always guaranteed, but always objectless, still to gain a value, always possible.  What is produced is different- only by virtue of a conceptualizing it as an object, as such it can gain a value, and this is a description of something other than this, which is then open to deconstruction, philosophizing, critically evaluation and comodification etc.

 

 

 

 

On method- as  historically text structuralizes thought, the avoidance of thinking in a certain way becomes  the avoidance of writing  as representation,  our problem then is best expressed in writing, can only be expressed as both being complex, deferred, unstable, and present in its activity which leaves an unstable mark,  in writings uncertainty and complexity. This is not to engage in the meaning of writing  but the meaning of thought, the thinking of thought,  as an opened meaning of the prior graphical, objective thought, the problem of meaning is not the problem of knowing what one means, this knowledge is always a postori and closes the activity of thought, and so we  use meaning  in a way more than its  historical sense, keeping its historic sense but bringing to it the history of consciousness and its presence, of thought before the event, and not as yet some idea or episteme,  and specifically in cases where this involves the presence of ethical and aesthetic consciousness then this is what I will  call  art.

 

We then push words - with all they still have and are, into a space on which they need to work harder than before, we overload them now with our self,  in this creative, and not created space which is always new, we allow them to become creative, this  creation must also now be new, as we are, be new, the word must first uncreate itself to begin to express itself, and through this our self,  the presence of itself, first disappears, is disappearing, is a presence , this presence a disappearing of itself, before someone, me, names it, and so before I name anything, even myself.

 

 

 

(Lets write towards this, this referent, without violence that wishes to establish a permanence which prevents this.)

 

(The purpose of this is subordinate. Too simple to be pragmatic or symbolic on some other text, or thing. )

 

Writing has always been about something written or something other - not of itself, but of the referent of this presence. Not a description, words, or a description of itself, as text. Or what text is. What then is this referent, open, lacking in violence of presence, giving in to itself and anything other. This referent is that which denies itself to itself and so is the prime cause. That is in simple naming and complex metaphysics .

 

(Language's presence and permanence is  a presence, as is all objects, including art objects - even when they do not signify a referent they offer a pretence of objective presence , permanent presence. )

 

Is a thought reciting, or has it a dynamic before the confrontation with the idea of an object, before it can be referred to. And how is it to be referred to, how is it, its status to be treated, sustained, in the past it was convenient to replace it with a sign.  And this is not to recourse to emotive gestures, but complex dynamic systems, a language must be as subtle as this. We have written out simplistic objects and now we are re-writing writing.

There are two sources of instability, one logo-philosophical the other aesthetic-ethic, of consciousness. From the later we do not create or judge objects but create the spaces for itself, its presence in whatever form, or not.   This space has a structure which is ontologically missing, absent, not even deferred- or is it in anyway transcendental. It feels incomplete which may provoke an activity towards it which is destructive - and contrary to what is provoked. That is its representation must be in a shifting - a moving- which is possible only now in a certain linguistic light. Literature is fixed and so cannot move in this space. Philosophy destroys it - yet there is nothing philosophically mysterious, imaginary, arbitrary about it, its ethics are our ethics its aesthetic the same, of what could be called instability, the mutability of consciousness in the first case, its move towards something in the second, a move towards a lie, all texts lie.

 

The need to be positive imposes new tasks on words. One is certain of this incompleteness, because of the impossibility of completion, without completing something else which is then lost to us.

 

 

 

Reading Nietzsche as a paradigm for reading art as language- or art as text -etc.

 

Reading Nietzsche and relying on a reading, what reading is, in the sense of partial reading or to ask the question how could it be a  complete reading, and as to where the contradiction is, where the error is, there, not if any at all, or in here, by recourse to itself, not a recourse to Nietzsche’s, then one can ask, who or what is one reading, and how, and why. How does one deal with such supposed dual, or multiplicity of  readings, and potential readings. I'm not answering such a question, in any case a dealing with... is, if not impossible  certainly unlikely, so  we are left with writing?  Potentially difficult in its sense of motivation regarding the empty tautological space - spaces? which are provided. If as we say a contradiction occurs, which is wrong, we invoke a reading of language which might well reduce to either tautologies or contradictions, how then is our reading a reading of anything at all. So if we want to read anything, read in a different way, to a fixing on some contradiction whoever is writing or reading, but  to engaging with them, which is very much what I at least would wish to do, as for Nietzsche, the development of his apparent contradictions, though I have tried to point to these, I would not mind playing a further part in whatever activity might take place around them, though  this is perhaps a philosophical task, or a task of literary criticism..  for myself however their role is essential in both destabilizing the text, is part of a  programme of writing before the logical framework, which is perhaps philosophy, or the end of art, the root of the idea. Around this disruption, which is yet to have a static object to disrupt, this is a site which interests me. We arrive disrupted, confused, yet these words - like all , work backwards from an idea of objectivity- only in some senses-  which is an idea of language,  and logic. Which places us back with the unspeakable, empty, diseased view of philosophy, metaphysics and questions of art. Not at ease, this is though the artistic condition as a disease, unease, which is to be dealt with, hidden, not -solved by the  writing, as important,  whether it be good or bad, and  the same could be said of speech, yet both are obviously empty- in themselves. They too quickly replace the disease, the disruption with an empty promise. The text  disrupts the subject with its objectivity at  the cost of this subjective space, at the cost of the subject’s subject ,if this is declined,  refused, and silence not entered into,  there is something significant here, it is  the opening of the text to thought, and thought to the text. Opening up of thought to itself, like an embrace. The embrace that both signifies and is its own subject, we are left with the feeling which language now embraces before a textual problem a problem opens itself to the idea of problem, and the idea of problem to the problem itself, which is present. The referent. Now why is it that the problems idea is hostile towards its referent, is all language the same. Behind this inscribed hostility is a person, who wishes to naturally overpower.

 

 

 

 

Iconographical metaphysics - here, is a picture of a desired impossibility, it is opaque,  which in its desirability, unachangability is a metaphysical 'idea' or picture, the desire, the lack in metaphysics of the cosmos, a lack for the impossible, the incompleteness of that which cannot be complete, not of the created impossible idea, but that being is disrupted not by itself, is itself disruption, desire of desire in our terms,  the aporia of language, a priori, the limit to being and knowledge which is indefinable, that which  language attempts - is a non-existent ideality, which as  the immediate presentation of the present   avoids the nihilism of the eternal return of the same's  non-teleological  presence.

 

If the a priori of  this text is not  (significantly or is) its subject , as of all texts?  and the problematics relating to textuality, the nature of the text but not the texts subject and the subject has a content that normalized grammars will not see it, other than perhaps a set of statements which can appear contradictory, it is both behind and before the writing and not here present in whatever form we consider, is not here a consideration, here it is a  mistake, one of many ,'these are never articulated, in the subject, but if at all in the event, this event, which follows the falsification of content and meaning.' Art - or anything other than language, only if we consider that language stands outside its description,  or otherwise we need to re cast the text towards its subject at the expense of its guarantees given above, at the expense of being what it has become. This subject itself being free of such guarantees, or systems, or yet to establish any, its pre-established state is not a consequence of its yet to be, or may be, or becoming, or eventuality, if we consider consequences in a particular way, non historical associations for instance.  Lets try to be positive, my  difficulty of naming is that the arrival of a name legitimates certain moves, rather perhaps there should be a list of names, for no other reason other than a psychological economy, at this instance, which is itself economic , movement, opening, longing, waiting, yet to begin,  even in phenomenology the subjectivity of a certain presence which  appears before  the presence, its presence, preventing the beginning of phenomenology itself, until the activity of phenomenology or anything else takes place and objectifies - or attempts to, de subjectifies at least, fails to ground, yet provides a ground.   The subject is represented by a state, a feeling which is a presence which was once established as some movement towards an object, as here it is also. This writing in itself now becomes a movement towards the subjective subject and not a description , or critique, deconstruction etc of it. It then becomes of itself a subject which destabilizes itself, and then moves before this, stepping outside of its own constraints, if it could step, and here it attempts, falsely a signification.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But the call to the thing itself is at the same time directed against historicism, which gets lost in treatises about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of types of philosophical world views - as already noted, neither have we committed this time / structure to be linear, branching, dense or discrete etc. The answer to the pseudo-metaphysical question is not that we must revise these restrictions so as to provide for such cases, some poststructuralist semiotics as social semiotics are concerned with signifying practices in specific social contexts but we employ modalities in doing the former, of course, in what was called abstraction, in which we are aware of the difference between the modalities but we do not isolate them.

Much as we would make much of this agreement to write as an end in itself, even calling it one of the few unanimous decisions we took, and given the above analysis of the conclusion of  transcendental deduction, which demonstrates that all synthesis is subject to the categories, it is puzzling to find for instance Kant claiming that the unity of formal intuition precedes all concepts, yet presupposes a synthesis. In the (new) Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes all concepts, although it indeed presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, but through which all concepts first become possible.  We have little interest in modern metaphysics which regards itself with respect to the new  absolutes of foundationialism and tries by means of this, its own grounding, to integrate the other sciences , philosphies etc. as a pre-ontological knowledge according to its own standards of truth; or the opposite case,  the modern philosophies, theories etc which makes of themselves  absolute foundations and, if need be, appropriates elements of metaphysics according to its own methodology by this process the whole as such, surveying its entire content, itself emerges out of this wealth wherein its process of reflection seemed to be lost.

 

In the light of such conclusions, our  question is not fundamentally about the certainty of knowledge, signs, symbols, speech and writing on the basis of the, states, affections and what holds for consciousness, that holds here for so called subjective existence in general. On the contrary, we understand ideas primarily in the act of using them; reflective, theoretical awareness of them as distinct, extant things which develop from these, after all,  would be quite possible in view of the difficulty of effecting a transition from metaphysics to another kind of thinking. It is often very difficult to be able to decide what predicates are to be taken as primitives and which are to be defined via suitable nominal definitions outside of metaphysics yet inside art, nothing like what is called the explanation of the manner in which a priori concepts which can relate to objects.

 

Connections with intuitionistic’s were noticed early on and toposes are still used to investigate models of various aspects of intuitionis, instead of the inner activity and self, movement of its own actual intention, such a simple determination of direct intuition, Anschauung  which means here sense, knowledge  is predicated in accordance with a superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is a false construction. There has been a strong though by no means unanimous trend in  development of such conceptualism, when new techniques for understanding art were supposedly being developed and that understanding itself was being transformed! (sic) Kant described what this in effect was as the relationship between the critique of reason and the science of metaphysics which has to be grounded anew by means of the concept of transcendental philosophy,  I would not wish to use the title transcendental with relation to knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects, Kant did not demand that one completely do without these instruments in philosophical knowledge, but that one should become aware of their specific difference of performance in the respective knowledge of the object itself - and this would prove useful in particular, it will be useful to see whether this sort of theisis or objection  towards a theoretical positioning is involved in anything which would follow from the truth the universality of any logical set of events as practiced by the phenomenologist qua artist - non conceptually, from the very beginning the universality in which he or she becomes the totality of his/her practice? -  processes bring about objects not only as a  thematic of the individual processes of intentionalities and thereby discloses its noematic components; it further directs itself on the intentions of the activity, which lies in both the history and programme of conceptual art towards this  relative presence.  Similarly, because of this external and historical - instituitional hostility towards such structures we have here now something under such a risk - even towards the  empirical research and deductive - analytic  logics of post -modernity in general.

 

The fundamental meaning of exactness in all of this lies in its being founded on an a priori formal system where each part unfolded in a specific act which can through praxis produce theory similar to general theories elsewhere - we see talk of theories of ethics etc. theories  of  pure concept, theory of idea, etc for a hermeneutics described as a condition, at the outset as the unbreachable basis for its method, that can avoid problems - an alienation between the physical and the natural as an instance.. (Looking at the arguments in the foregoing paragraphs what legitimates the value judgements if they relate to old teleological requirements or tendencies - such primitives in logic which rested on the idea that if any two sentences mean the same, then they are about the same things- and this is in effect challenged.) In contrast to these sets codes we may be forced by some considerations to adopting non codes - structurally simpler objects which critically are pushed to the point of being empty - empty of symbolic meaning but not of some empirical concept - which then can generate a basic for semotics etc. , originally - like in history not employing standard conventions and formulas , so they can generate cliches and stereotypes brought to stand in being called to cast itself as self in one of its possibilities of existing and committing itself to a draft of itself .

 

The empirical does not allow for the evaluation of normative claims especially if its own is a separate point from the critique of the general importance of certainty and control in The New Art, thus, even though Derrida can say that diffrance is the condition of possibility for presence, he will not permit this term to be recuperated and thence become the site of origin itself - this has an obvious importance to us here. Now how do things stand in relation to this subjectivity? Modern theories of self, organization phenomena have several roots which did look for control hierarchies, but we quickly see more complex behavior that opposed the reductionism of the modern, universal as metaphysics, distinguishing itself from the traditional principles first fundamentally in regard to this methodology- if it should so be called. It recognizes its self, a reflective function  of its self, examination  for the relative realization of the correlative practical idea of sense, whose structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, it recognizes its self, reflective function for the relative realization of the correlative practical idea of a second sense, whose structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, namely as one consciously and purposively directed towards this absolute idea.

 

From premises of that kind it is or might be concluded that real thought in fact took other forms and was governed by other laws than those that this current logic considered the sole determinations of intention. For example, on one reading of the following sentences. 

1:Theory is a victim especially of this misunderstanding because, apart from refusing to shift from the metaphysics of subjectivity to a consideration of  being as being, it adamantly insists on a fundamental drafting of being as egoistic, ie as an egoistic subject, into which it then introduces the imperative, absolute ethics of the other.

2: Everything that was discussible has been discussed; this is true is no longer

in order to express the occurrence of events, but we use events  to express that events occurs over time.

 

 

  

M

 

We have described the position regarding logics before the epoche in the phenomenological event as being absent and non foundational, and the dangerous consequences of theory, the old syntactic and semantic rules etc., the use of which is so fatal to subjects which could be described as being empty ,i.e. the history of art and language. With the - so called - but not- empty subjective space the free play can and does allow in certain circumstances - i.e. performative acts etc. - the 'whatever it means to you is what it means' approach, typically cited in  post-modernity, which occurs for what may be a number of reasons, which  however is not a singular approach  if we regard the  ethics which are in very simple terms present  in the very act of intentionality,  seeing, destabilization, instability, phenomenological presence, as  presence of a wish or desire ,want, need, etc.

We are then in being honest open to judgment, and in turn offering judgment which communicates prior to meaning and theory etc, prior to symbolic evaluation,  which is a significant externality, as well as an internality and such judgments being ethically based are free of tautology, are flexible, unstable themselves, which is here  a good, not a bad thing. We can now see how fixed rules, old syntactic and semantic rules, etc, simply wont do in regards to the world.  The alternative pragmatic free play - anywhere- but especially throughout all of what is called post modernity is essentially hedonistic, the 'whatever it means to you is what it means' of post-modernity, is hedonistic. In placing ethics before this, it forces a limit on the pragmatic and opens a space in the hedonistic pragmatic field in which once again perhaps we can communicate, that is recognize the difference, the instabilities, between others but primarily first in establishing ourselves, as subjective, dynamic entities, and so remember and so avoid the downside of the 'whatever it means to you is what it means',  a kind of eventual chaos from which one is unable to escape, to the extent that even the subject becomes lost. There can be no art here even as absence, (want, need, etc which elsewhere is called instability) for what may or may not be possible, as even when non realization is concrete the wish, desire etc, is effectively dealt with by the propositions of pragmatism.

The morality of intention, position, description, state, desire, wish  etc, without which it  wouldn’t be is yet another parallel thread.

i should note - though personally there is no need- that the status of "can",  is sufficient, a possibility is sufficient, as even its provisional state attributes itself, this problem then doesn’t arise, the pragmatic response if it chooses, is to ignore this, to completely remove it, and so effectively remove everything,  and this is why Post-modernity is amoral,  it seeks stability and attempts to fix itself, even in its free play. This ethics arises from this, lack of permanent presence, intention, position, description, state, desire, instability, wish  etc. ,it is there,  as an ethics, a morality, but one which is self aware.

 

 Does this then impose itself on us. i don’t think it does - for then it would destroy this, its own  instability .This morality is from outside. The best name.. A society - is this? .. It is irrelevant to ...the actuality of each day, each deconstruction, lack of permanent presence,   etc.

Any text tries to stabilize this  instability and so it is not ethical, as is any text which opens itself to free play etc.  Meaning, answers, questions, provide solutions and these are not moral  activities. You can not do anything with this given instability. It destabilizes itself yet fails to remove itself - replaces itself with something else which is itself unstable, incapable of Becoming form, as each form materializes it remains, as an instability.

 

 

 

 

The problem of art is not simple, simplistic notions just wont do. The phenomenological activity, the epoche, is internal and in all cases is yet to open itself to logic, or philosophical problemizing, it is then a complex problem. It is a problem of intention. To intend to problematize is the causality of modernity, within our work now there is no causality, there is non i think generally in phenomenology anyway. The intention and the problem coexist, in a manner which is not causual, non teleological.  The coexistence outside of causality avoids the conclusion of an object. Such complex parallism avoids the lack of dimensionalities of logic. But this is getting prescriptive or descriptive of the very unfixed problematic state. We do not need to use words in new ways. We need to avoid prescriptive logics and clever tricks. External ideas. we are still in the wrong mental set, still looking

 

but what we can do is a decisive step away from even intention and problem, otherwise we are bound to these by some causal logic, some ethics of empiricism, of phenomenologisism.

 

And here we can as it were we use language differently.

 

 

 

 

intentionality  is  the product of a primitive instability. It follows  that all texts are provisionally unstable.  what is it then which singles this out. Firstly its reluctance to take this on, secondly its own intention as an intention. This looks like tautology, but it isn’t in that it distances itself from itself and differentiates itself from itself.

 

The moment of recognition of the problematic of distancing in intention is a phenomenological event before the decisive act, which in this case apriori will not become decisive, the decision is this recognition of what becomes, what always is unrecognizable what is not accurately casually describable.

 

I can see a potential criticism in a lack of difference, and such a problematic might be considered as a new subject, a good thing , a new source of discussion, however its really a kind of metaphysical criticism, and we are operating beneath this, before it. And so the first answer, a metaphysical answer, is that  we are not doing metaphysics, though there might Be an analogous opportunity in metaphysics. There are I think  however  other answers which do not  depend on any metaphysical critique.

 

I suppose a logical one is simply that we will only find identity in an ideality,

and we are seeing the destabilization  of our intention as not a consequence of our intentionality towards an ideality but as a deliberate act, of a phenomenological epoche which subjectively is always different.

The refusal to give in to logical  difference, or not, is a refusal to engage with the metaphysics of logic or the logic of logic.

 

There are others, from elsewhere we know that the play of difference  de stabilizes a status quo, the signified , the  signifier is the play of difference.

That  identicalities are,  is an aporia,

The identity of indecernables maybe like wise and the contradictions of the eternal return etc.  Our difference however lies in the relation of our problematic towards itself, firstly recognizing it as described as an internal destabilizing source and so deliberately before this logical - empirical destabilization takes place, intending a prior   destabilization as a phenomenological intention, and  this has to Be different. even before logic establishes its difference, or the phenomenological realization does as we intended it in the first place, destabilization is  always present, always different.  If it were not then we have an ideality, which is firstly impossible, but more importantly not wanted, not present, as its presence would remove the problematic.   That is the old mistake.

 

 

 

The space in which this specific language describes its subject is uncertain, as is the ability for any descriptive process to take place. This was termed our problem, and by others seen as a final act of some reductionist step. The examination or re-examination of such texts is another activity in its self.   A text may have to have a subject - a pre text - and yet in itself can develop other subjects, this is where we might differentiate ourselves from some deconstructionist program of making something new. Our pre textual intention is art as not a reductive questioning, which borrows much from analytical philosophy, but as a destabilizing process, recognizing  itself and it simultaneous subject.  the goal here is not an ontological destabilization, and not the destabilizing of something, anything else. Its  fairly obvious why this should be so, the move towards abstraction is as good an example as any where Destabilizing the ontology may well be seen as the problematic. Or in conceptualism... But as soon as we realize the problematic the artwork is realized and completed. Yet a repetition or copy of this work is no longer considered art  is perhaps the result of the removal of the problematic and not the primacy of a solution. The primacy of solution paradigm was effectively removed by the failure or success of conceptualism which in effect nullified the idea of art. It became an ideality.  Anyway without the problematics of art there would be no art.  This very thing is after all what we want, what the whole thing is about. The insight is sufficient to see how then it is possible to continue. Historically but not presently  Each time we find a problem it is a case or possible site for how we deal with its actuality. Modernism mistakenly attempted an analysis , a kind of enlightenment ethic, one in which understanding mapped the limits of the cosmos, we could do art, the evidence of this is still in the museums. A conceptual critique of this only refined art into the problem of art to be dealt with. Not other problems for Intentional activities do not occupy physical spaces and problems within them are not concepts or theory. We do not have to prove our questioning here, or is it an empty question, remember we had an intention, a motive for doing this.  This problem may well be an indication of the scale, an infinite scale, of the difference between the ideality and the intention. I am not concerned with the ontology of the ideality, or any special supposition which we can place in the most pessimistic of places, but with the danger of some self satisfied description. This simply will not do, is disrupted by all kinds of externalities, but the artistic move here is our intention to disrupt it ourselves. Or better at the same time finding this.. Ontology, of any kind, has absolutely nothing to do with art from our point of view, as an artist.  The phenomenology  of the question -not  why we question - is the artistic act.  The question has a content not based around this ideality of art and our attitude towards it, it is there already fully developed. Our attitude towards it is not as an ideality, we simply cant compare, it's another’s problem, with no stable epistemological framework, no doubt as serious a problem as ours is. The framework itself  appears as a transcendental question. And this is wrong from an art practice point of view, it must be reversed,  we are again attempting to say something about art as ideality, yet  what is actually happening is something to do with our intentionality, it's the cause of our problem, its obvious that it is, we feel it so.  There could be all kinds of reasons for these problems, as exposed by analysis, philosophy etc. and there might in principle be a way of dealing with them, from outside, or we could simply  pragmatically ignore them, but here is our move as artist, we want a particular problem to be a phenomenological instance, we intended this to be so. Any acceptance stops our activity.  There is no need to underline this act as a kind of objective framing. All previous ideas of transcendence, overcoming, re-stating, refining, making, etc are not questioned, but the intentionality is so framed as to open itself to itself , and not some other problem. That is our aim is not an arbitrary questioning or revision, our aim moves no further than itself as question. This is a very particular kind of question empty of any content except itself, and that is why it cant be answered and that is why is can be validated if it needs to be. Each time the moment of this question is realized we have another site for an art work. It is never though some intention at ideality, it has been realized in post-reductionism terms that it is itself which is the only possibility.

 

 

 

Intentionalities may be regarded as some objective ideality, but I would  not like to do so here. There is no value in this, what I want is not a foundation building exercise, this quickly looks like tautology if it keeps to some set of consistent rules. This new space is uncertain, the process disruptive. And neither do we want imaginary objects, if everything is provisional then its that which we need to destabilize. It appears I am doing something I cant do, not just setting up things to be knocked down or are we  making progressive systems.

 

Language is once again at the service of experience, and not supplying any donotic insight or bags of rules. The mistaken confusion was elaborated so that the method became the arbiter, the confusion was and is real, the problematic also, and the interplay between the various significant systems something quite other, the problematic is both pre and post linguistics, things like meaning and use. The awareness of the problematic was never intended first as being useful, it is after all a morphological feature in the past. How meaning, words, work here is radicalized and not random. Syntactically if allowed to run its course language eventually  empties itself. But these problematic of meaning exposed the remaining phenomenology of the real, and what well call the intentional subjective problematic of art, once the structures of meaning in language are removed. That is this is not a question but the presence of absence, elsewhere described as instability, absence of ideality, recognition of the possible presence of an ideality yet still intending it. The criteria for impossibility and contradiction being removed not by the failure of language but by the continuation of our wish to hold on to this unresolved, unresolveable....  A captured image of a movement which removes itself in its movement.

 

We have moved beyond process of destabilization as casual intentionality into actual destabilization as an apriori. So we have removed the worry of what to do, the difficulty of what to do, causality is planning  and planning gives rise to causality, and causality gives rise to objects, whether material or not as signifiers of something which cannot be signified, in a field of truth mapped by untruths.

 

Language as meaning is only one object among others, and meaning is a finality. An excuse.  The reuse of it in evidencing these unstable phenomenologisims  could be described as representing a new abstraction of representationalism. It is then seen philosophically, where old philosophy looked for meaning and stability, as negative phenomenology, a negative philosophy though not anti-philosophical.

The philosophical here is used as another analogy of what we are doing. We talk about the problems of philosophy , the problems of art, as something to be solved, something to be dealt with, yet the word arises after the fact and logic after the word...

This is not to dismiss logic or language as a pragmatic structure. No matter how well it accounts something remains which is not a wish, romantic, mystical presence, but can be  described as a  problematic presence towards which  our intentionality   can not causally be placed.  They remain layered together outside of a, the,  sentence with absent ideality etc etc, in no conceptual chain. The problematic destabilizing itself, its ontology, its epistemology, etc etc. . After all surely it must do that.

 

 

 

Intentionality and the exposure of is problematic could be described as a descriptive attempt which does not engage in art activity, but this is a naive approach, if the activity was to set itself as  the area for the problem to exist in it would play a role.

 

 

 

However when we focus on this problem we see it is not a problem at all in any ordinary sense.  Or is it a casual process. Now I am not  engaging in a kind of metaphysics about this non objective non subjective intended, having dismissed the ideality as an impossible intention, it is no longer the impossibility of the intention towards an ideality which is a cause of failure. Only historically. An historical naivety which is beside the point, we cant really say anything like this, as its about this that  we do not concern ourselves without concerning ourselves with  ontology. Or are we drawing up lists, we are engaging in the actual activity of an intention towards art. Other things of course appear, we are not naive purists, or boring tautologists. Or can we abstract some kind of formulae- such as ……... Its not a question of epistemology. There is neither a multiplicity or a singularity. This not  a pre chaotic state of undifferentiates which appears post analytically, but the result of an intentional act towards a ideality. Not (a subjectification of the object or attempt at objectivity, the ideal remains an impossibility, the subjective remains as a totality. But there is no point to this. We have chaos- subjectivity, pragmatics, wishful thinking, and the impossible idealality. We regard the ideality as a site of failure of both subject, and  object. However we are not bothered with (this) failure.

 

 The event around idealities and language, of pragmatics and their limits regarding idealities has first pragmatically removed idealities from consideration by some, but by others placed them in an unreachable location, and importantly opened up the ground between the absolute of the ideality and the pragmatics of the subject. This has to be a generalized ground at its limits- at the ideal, but between such convergent idealities we have an intentional space which can have titles such as art  philosophy science , mathematics  etc. The intentionality moves us from the pragmatics of a null subjectivity into this field. There is no reason for this to be a negative field but we need to be aware of the nature of this fields instability, it is essentially unstable, neither a subjective pragmatic, which can be fixed, a decision, or an actual impossible ideality. The metaphysics of this instability is interesting but surely it is undecideable as to their causalities. 

 

What we have are  the intentional spaces which we have described above, spaces which are essentially unlimited.

 

It now requires us to see how such essentialities can themselves be destabilized, are destabilizing. This is relatively simple, an simple intentionality will do.

 

 

 

Elsewhere texts have attempted   a critical and positive step from  a multiplicity of possibilities- which are not considered as objects, writing, communications, internalities, and  these texts have exposed these themes. To re-examine these would be like going backwards to synthesize an object out of its fragments. But already we have fallen victim to objectivity. What we have discovered  as essential is a critical subjectivity of destabilization.  Superficially it  might be difficult to see anything wrong with this , however in not  doing so we might be seen to be   replacing  its move, one of destabilization with another objectivity, or attempted objectivity, or illusion of an objectivity. We might once again find ourselves in a determinist descriptive world trying to do things such as figure out what art is.

the powerful lessons learnt, the significant discoveries of the absence of the art object was a reductionism and objective fact. Its the nature of this fact which can despite its apparent negativity ensure the very thing we want. A destabilizing activity, a subjectivity attaching itself to subjectivity in order to objectify itself.  The condition of pseudo theories such as other texts, is such that they can appear to objectify themselves  in order to be effective and so their very success is a  failure. Inhibiting other texts, and being essentially now a dead object. Such writing as other art before, essentially closes down everything. And we can dream up any number of sentences of the kind which point things out , even negatively. Self destabilization might be thought to be an ideal, but only in the sense that idealities are simply not allowed. A trite recourse to failed idealities misplaces or replaces the dynamics of non textual, non prescriptive discussion, activities etc. That something is said actualizes a destabilizing feature is only a logical and not artistic process. That offering meaning or abdicating it is also I think wrong. To ask What are your intentions is the response to this,  intetionalization cuts things off, stops them straight away, what things of course, neither. Both. Not neither but not in some middle ground, there has to be a radical use of language here which avoids certain placements, maybe all placements.

To cite something else is a grounding and therefore a bad move, a halting move. What’s wrong then is this, this very agreement.

 

We should not cite the...  as pun on site. There is no site. Neither is there a non-site.  Such sentences are difficult and potentially dangerous. We  need something not closed off, open , dynamic, non coding in a fixed way. The very play of codability non codabilty is not our business, it is just that we find this is a potential problem in misunderstanding the kind of structure we have, and how the word structure is being used.   perhaps  It is the non objectivity of the texts focus and not the texts non objectivity, disability, which is important. Any textual disability is besides the point. The real de-stability here - is here already, and wanted , but here already.. There are numerous things of uncertainty here. Intention, reality, subject, aporia of action. We break open the question, we don’t question it in some hall of mirrors fashion, or  remove it. We have radicalized the geography of the sentence and its causal chains, as they are responsible for placing stability as a universal.  and we are then in this new place. Such a position has no relation to an object, is neither   outside or inside the object, the object becomes not unbounded but its boundaries are no longer  binding.  It is the essential activity which only appears contradictory if we regard words such as ‘problem’ as meaning something quite specific, i.e. Not problematic. This fault is to be sorted out elsewhere,  but here it does not name but  generates the problem as itself.  The record of this, the reading of this is  not a de coding , problem to solution, which implies a set possibilities of success, yet the success of this here now has been assured in its own intention , and its own uncertainty is the guarantee and proof.  We move on to uncertainty and intention.

 

 

 

 

 

From a causal point of view and ignoring (I can I think borrow a term here - under erasure)  both matter, and media* , we can move on to examine  the play of logic and meaning, and here we can question meaning as it relates to  art, or, and art practice , we should return to this and or.... what occurs ……  here at this point  is a splitting, as opposed to a synthesis, (a very non dialectical move, an alternative dialectical move subsumes everything into the absolute...There art and every specificity disappears ) and at such a split the opportunity to move in two directions occurs, we have choice rather than a synthesis, yet perhaps only one of these can now  validate the artist and art.  .. Only one of these non synthetic choices is now - has now become - or is becoming - the artistic move. A separating out of a particular intention.    (Later and elsewhere the meaning of meaning is itself split, deconstructed, etc.) What is left on the other side of our question of the meaning of art from the question of meaning  could be called a place for art activity to take place. Is always the place it takes place. A conditional hiving off is a disruptive destabilizing activity in which where the one side relates to a move towards art is questionably art, the other to other objects etc.  We pursue , now  historically, the process through ontology towards a negativity, but this too can be destabilized, fragmented, questioned. And again a split occurs and a choice has to be made. This now appears like an endless and logical causal chain, it is perhaps the play of logic into meaninglessness,  an exposure of meanings inability to mean anything- even nothing- a metaphysics of nothing, and or a metaphysical failure, it is always attempting to capture what is outside, and  a decisive choice here has to be based on our initial and continued intention- and it this in causal terms which is what accounts for its non-philosophical move, away from problems of being - Metaphysics etc

A move which was not a move but an exposure of what was already present, and the intentionality which remains in this presence. I would call this a non pragmatic move as it does not any longer have any ideas about solutions.

 

 In this non pragmatic move into a space outside of pure subjectivity? Or not -  in the senses or arbitrariness,  pure objectivity or intentional objectivity,  we do not become involved in philosophy, even a radical philosophy - a philosophy which perhaps can also occupy  such a space, or become involved with trivial objects. Dead cows for instance.  I  make these points here to avoid any confusion as to what we are doing or better intending,; intention is here may well be crucial.

 

Where we are now is beyond the word itself as something stable,  and beyond the instabilities which Modernity either failed to deal with, or discovered, such as how things and substances differentiate themselves,  that there is here a particular thing before its name could be particularized. How this coalesced how it can be de- coalesced, and through ideas  of  instability  in  communication taking place, how these are questioned etc. Therefore the position of the word the text, the before or after the word as something definite, we do not single out, or use this as a critique or a methodology or better an intentionality that we already had,   this itself, is now not as it was, an imaging, a means of producing a  set of propositions.

 

 

 Numerous structures now disappear, which can be, have and are being  critically considered, this as opposed to a negation, a negative reductionist move, there dissapperance leaves a presence. (Without meaning, meaningless too disappears, nihilism is the product, a result of logic.)

 

The ideas that are  essentially  against this negative, reductionist move need not be followed, we can consider these structuralist, outside art with their own problematics.   If we consider all reductionist moves might arrive at dead ends, they destabilize reading and logic, and this removes them, does  not put them under erasure, regarding art activity, the move in art which apparently arrived at  a dead end, is removed. This is one removal, from outside. The second more radical removal  is internal and simply rejects reductionisms conclusion, after allowing it, on the empirical evidence, there is something still present. Even if it were not we could intend it.   what was exposed in reductionism was a displacement of idealities, now the location of these may be  regarded as  a dead end   if one regards the absolute ideality as a possible reality, or as achievable, but now its removal or arrival has not removed our intention or ability to do so. Its removal, or arrival has made it possible to defend ourselves from being called unreasonable, or meaningless, as in it total presence there is something else, or a possible intention, and in its absence there is a presence or possible intention. 

 

And so we have a very limited  pretext in which to work, because of the removal of certain spaces, structures, logics et al.  Spaces  between perfect - (and non realizable) idealities, and complete but pragmatic subjectivities.

 

  Any number of destabilizing texts may appear, and appear possible and  we can admire these, appreciate these but we are now as it were underneath them. They are destabilized by our intention - which we now see which is neither pragmatically fixed or ideally fixed.  The very failure of modernity  which produced such an instability such un certainty gave us a methodology - and importantly showed an alternative,  perhaps in its own confusion gave us the opportunity to see that the problematic of art remained, and we wanted it to remain, we actually liked and like it.

 

  As for the pragmatics of stabilization, justification within post-modernism, these old forms are ok, they have in the face of the destabilization chose to ignore what was empirically exposed, which I think  in effect has been to ignore art as an intentional activity. 

It may be a legitimate move to not become involved in other activities - but certainly if we avoid the problematics regarding art, we avoid art altogether.

 

 

*This ignoring is a token for a complex activity of analysis perhaps best regarded from other disciplines. The term is not pejorative either externally or internally. But importantly we are not ignoring our particular intentionality.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Any text sets out to say something in a certain denotative way must be suspect with regards to art activity.

We do not want to talk about the problematics of text, or texts, here. Art has consistently  refused to engage in the problematics of any given text, theme or subject. In particular it seems to locate only to draw attention to what it is not, only to displace these objects, text or not. From an art point of view the textual  structures like any other structures are of no concern in themselves, in their histories, this is  even at the extreme of ignoring the truth, or radically not having any serious regard for  the technicalities of any science, semiotics etc, such as even the status of the signifier and the signified. Their relationships, status, histories etc. This is why I have said elsewhere we have in comparison a radicalization of the use of language. However the text here, is not through   its formalities  in error regarding art, its error must be elsewhere, actually in its stability. This does not mean that the textual move was a mistake, those who have called such a move a blind alley were I think mistaken.  It was the only possible route away from the physical object art object paradigm. The so called failure in textuality was in a way to be expected the same kind of thing happened elsewhere when chasing such absolutes. So also To engage in semantic meaning, or nonsense, or poetics is mistaken even if it is not a blind alley, as is analysis of any kind whatever, psychological, philosophical, metaphysical etc.

Formally the texts records - badly - but its the best we can do - the art practice, its properties then are irrelevant, relevant is, or better was,   the ability to pose in text a question. Distinguishing itself as text was  irrelevant to art, so text is mere pragmatics, and that is why it becomes radicalized. What can be said as a detailed  questioning, critical, responsive process etc cannot   be achieved in other media, where we see the - you see what you want attitude regarding   gallery objects, the gallery  situation was  only ever a very primitive formal presentation of completed stable objects. The objects here are closed, anthropomorphically dead, and speechless. But another possibility is that of speech, the relationship of text to speech need not concern us - in the face of other media the questions that are raised are phonetic, whether speech or writing, it is the structural purpose as use which was important and still is, that is significant in pushing the problematic of art further, we could look at the question, the thought, But not to- again- question its process but to show its failure. to phrase this positively, this becomes what art is, as seen, experienced.

 

 

 

the radicalization of  this language is the result of the radicalization of the art activity,

 How is it that idealities became  a problem is resolved in their position as problems. Art - as art may  function as some semiotic / philosophic or pseudo-philosophic tool, whatever art as art means,  outside yet defending this tendency and such an activity might  be  socially very useful,  but  so might be our radicalization. we are after all trying. Whatever, I am not heading towards some wonderful derridaian autonomy, even if , and I doubt it, it happens. Ones own psychological position is difficult; which is symptomatic but in no way conclusive. Whatever. Is it like this or like that, whatever, it is specific. And here is something someone might say is an original and positive statement. Although specification is kind of boundary drawing. We must move on. we must avoid solutions, why?  Why cant these equally become radicalized. This after all could be called a solution.  this activity - which is art - is fundamentally illuminating in the nature of things. It might from outside validate  its morphology.

 

So if we are not satisfied with this, how psychologically fatal this would be.

 

 

 

"doubt can  exist only where a question exists"  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

 

Firstly and historically, 'art' is the instability of its own definition, the instability of its signifier and the instability of its signified. Secondly art in late modernism - in conceptualism,  is the instability of the ideas around its ontology.. Whether this reflects a cultural, philosophical , biological , or even cosmological - metaphysical - fact, is besides the point from an art point of view. The artist engages in the instability, is its actor. The mistake, and part of the de-stabilization , is looking for final definitions. And of course now here is such a mistake. But allusions to philosophy -biology - history - art history - culture - parody - humor - politics are  even more besides the point. we do not define either negatively or positively, but create the instability, or rather point it out in the now present, now present text. This text's status as art is (then) essentially unstable?

Critically we are  caught between logical certainties and methodologies - we note Nietzsche - heidegger and derrida's challenges, questioning of truth, logocentricism et al. - or something nonsensical, even poetic.

 

That there is a general epistemological instability is interesting,(outside or above and so inclusive of art), if art was to be descriptive it would certainly define this general - philosophical- metaphysical instability - elsewhere called deconstruction. I might even criticize the term if I was not principally interested here  in art, and not here! interested in philosophy, ontology etc..  The prima-facie case I will go on to make isn't the historical instability but the inherent instability here now, and the nature of this, its proper naming, or inability to do so.  The status of this work as art does not lie in its willingness to be uncertain, unstable, any critical position is in itself challengeable, I could imbed such a challenge here, but that it attempts to indicate that the problematic remains no matter what. Why this defacto or de jour cannot be realized is obvious- though maybe it should be re stated, its restatement can again be challenged. Remember Russell's  remarks regarding the tractatus - it throws up an uncertainty as to truth. Yet here we don’t even have any given criteria  as to the significance of truth, or whatever. We are left with the art and its ontology   having a greater uncertainty, instability - if you like than philosophy, in Russell's sense, but perhaps not elsewhere. However its only psychologically reassuring to find oneself in company, there is no internal assurance as to right or wrong. Both absolute positions and any other are questionable. And so on and so on.

 

Perhaps at this point we need to say more about materials, however such a discussion would be a kind of anthropological investigation, texts as signs are simple in pragmatic terms. Specifically its the conceptual instability and not the physical instability which makes us artists and not physicists, galleries and objects represent places for the physics of instability to be demonstrated. And  restoration does not restore art back to the object. so I would consider the method of writing firstly as pragmatic, though there are difficulties with this, in how we write, with regard to meaning as expressed in language as being casual or logical, problems with the idea of equivalents etc.

 

The legitimating of the art practice has to be in the first place with the artist,  how do you know you are doing art unless you are questioning the activity , other wise you are probably  doing something quite different and allowing some external definition- and so some external person as  artist.

modern day impressionist painters are painters, modern day conceptualists are conceptualists

 

so we need to reject the idea of concept as art, but still  accept the discussion. The Judd dictum about anyone calling anything art is an excellent example. It relates to a specific historical destabilizing, and the product of a new- and Judd’s- position, which is a new definition, or art object. Its truth or not is not as important as the ability to take up views about it. That is destabilize its objectivity. In a way he doesn’t know what he is talking about.

 The recognition here is that we cant get answers which are in anyway fixed. Consumerism maybe demands a pragmatic art, and that has been typical of post-modernism but in our definition it isn’t art at all, as its taken the pragmatic step of making a decision, it enters the gallery- or re-enters- and so there is nothing more to be said , nothing more to see, nothing more to do, the artistic move here was - if any - the moment of curatorial decision, however in reality the curatorial position has already presupposed art and its objects.  One does not re-discover America these days. One might discover something of it, but any object based curatorial or artist- move is now about objects, and I include concepts, politics, feminism, et al. And others. In other words not art. As artists brought in by questioning other things, so they are excluded - or else everything is included.  the point of the pragmatic inclusive decision is we then have to either discuss it or not. The objects then are if we do, clearly not the same, we then maybe wish to back down from this position, but again so long as we are doing the thinking its us that is realizing the art. The object once this process is over returns to it original and pre-artistic state. Just as in aestheticism, once no longer beautiful the object returns to its original state. Once the Beautiful is separated from art by a questioning process, a raising of doubt in modernity of the qualification of a objects properties as art we move to other considerations. However even when the aesthetic was concerned as being an attribute its nature was also unstable. The de-stabilizing of the material object-art paradigm  was the achievement of conceptualism.

 

This was only one in a series of destabilizations, of representation, of subject, of content etc which was modernity.

Conceptualists first engaged with the concept as object.  Objectivity followed  to a collapse in the ability to find a stable conceptual object at all. All this is history, and as such Belongs in a museum. The move was not made in which  Not the concept as object but concept as process before the object was arrived at. Such a destination is of course outside of art, which explains why it was avoided.  

But the alternative seemed to put an end to any activity at all, other than subjective and empty gesture. However if the radical move was made and the subjectivity of post modernity’s rush to make objects, again, is avoided we are not, as it was thought left with nothing, left with nothing to do. In removing the historical edifice of modernity we actually do expose something. At the very minimum a space for intentionality, which is not the excuse for objects.

 

The destabilizing process at this point does not collapse into nothing, for the same reason as the removal of a philosophical system does not remove its cause, there was a cause and before this cause gained its causality a presence, and in the absence of a presence the space for an intention.  The failure of a logical system due to internal inconsistencies does not necessarily remove the reasons , the intentions for its use, and these need not be some other inconsistency. Logical, metaphysical, biological, cosmological etc. Its possible still to want to do something and until we say what it is we cant say its a mistake.

 

 

 

'Generalizations -in art and philosophy'  where we can refer to 'this'. and not a specific- and this is maybe sufficient, so  sufficient then that specific disciplines, activities and subjects must too be generalized. Intentionally - is a modified metaphysics, a modified process or even a modified theology, we are in effect dealing with de-polymorphic activities, pre conceptual attitudes

 etc. - before specifics- is an interesting area in which to be. /sic/

Missing - this- as in a consideration of non presence and the need to now show that we can avoid missing premises is a possible tactic of both this activity and its simultaneous writing. These become specifics in themselves, and not dialectical subjects / objects/ we are not interested in dialectics.

 

 

'That nothing makes a difference.' - we do not need to consider the so called objects of communication in art which  fail to make a difference to the psychological being of the phenomenological presence of what has been called the iconography of art - before its logos - and neither the appearances, images, texts grammars etc. - after the epoche - which is after this moment, - we would say prior to perception- are differences seen- these objects fail to difference consciousness- the phenomenology of being - present in the subjective subject which- this - we call here art,  - rather  the logical structures have been seen both in short terms and in its histories to change - and so articulate - signify - in this subjective revealing of their fictions as objects of the conscious field,  of developing an ontology, in which case we see ontologies as pseudo-ontologies as subjects of private iconographies - which appear never to change.

 

We can as what others have called the / what we would like to call deep/ phenomenological epoche before sign and signifier - before ontology and metaphysics, history etc, this  landscape of the particular before its actual description - before it particularizes itself - or is made into an event -  as it in it's self consciousness is always identical - with itself- always different to anything else- even when it is an historical event - of remembering, could be considered as a iconographic act, it is - here called art - but elsewhere philosophy etc. and we might consider such an answer to be that its presence is not iconographically opaque - but resides as a universal potential.

 

This  is not  a drawn description, it is not a history, not a raw phenomenon , and that then goes for any signification, beyond the subjects subject - as art which could be described not in morphological terms - reusing the language of morphology etc, but in a new language which could be thought of as art as i.e. non signified private language activity- or not - but something far wider - far more complex.

 

 

 

 

'or should we consider art as a private language '

 

Essentially there is only one listener.

 

Who is it that listens and why, it might be said we listen to familiarize the self - lets compare this to game playing, entertainment or education, having 'pet' theories, and detailed knowledge of given facts. If we wish to explore truth, and thought, and why should we, what would be wrong in not doing so, - we need not to direct thought and consciousness at its own instability but use this as a method of experience of the general….,  in any private language, a private language as language without a reader, the excuse for such thinking would validate itself now, which it does so, must do, the compromise occurs only in simple social communications - which legitimate the power of the word, sign, over the signified individual.

 

Given a reader what we then explore are the limits of communication at its most abstract, any audience revolves around the prospects of fascism, and these problematics - socio-economic -cultural. etc.

Removing these - we still are faced with the continuing problem - that is what as I can I do, and what difference this makes, what difference anything makes in some teleology.

 

 Which is a solution to the working out of the problematic, far from being a sterile phenomenon it is productive, unlike the socio-artistic-conceptualist -etc which inevitably after failing logically - implicit or explicitly- abandons meaning for elegance.

The movement has been to amalgamate the synthetic in avoidance of the logical object to subjective narration, avoiding  the hierarchies of questioning which supposed an answer, but a narration of the many problematics - which is both art and the life-world - cosmos,

avoiding metaphysics and such nonsense, which then is not complete but a mark, signification etc. but narration is only an excuse here at signifying the proto-world before objects, which is hidden by the sediments of language, logic and meaning, and against a belief in such devices with their teleological implications.

 

 

Where we might have said….A brief note to begin.. where or when such things developed is an historical interest- morphology, overloading- or hiding of the object, in theory - the synthetic productions of extreme parallelism   et al. are historical events within some structure - both- all- generated out of a particular instantiation- and not of a class, or culture, as a  productive, pragmatic , capitalist  move- the devolvement of hierarchies -  networks  of various and varying topologies, being actively open to historicizing or being regarded as ontologically present in the past or present or not...-etc. There is yet to be information- this is defined from instances  in the form of generalizations, which produces symbols, signs,  language, formality  and images, tautologies logics,  aesthetic screens and finally in this process, this list, epistemologies etc. which is an attempt at a formal generalization- of a 'metaphysical' instance. Such a description in itself could be constructed by reference to an instance- in fact all such generalizations need to be made specific with regard to their genesis, and seen therefore less than they actually appear,   language needs to degeneralize itself and rediscover its subject. Otherwise it becomes a legal instrument for the prevention of genesis. - life - experience- process creativity etc.

 

 

"Why a text of a particular subject would need to be seen as being empty is in order not to have a reflexive permanent content or even one which is or can be regarded in the light of future textual analysis. "

 

within this, our practice the text will always be open to its particular subject and in order to do so will need to empty itself, or maybe at least to a hostile reader appear to do so! - to be an abstract  class  for the subjects world space, it cannot then be either public,  or static, which would remove, or allow removal, modification etc. of its particular instantiation , and so allow further reuse, reevaluation, interpretation , analysis and deconstruction- of its content - world space, and not just its abstract methods (there are non), as seen here.   That the class, this class, container is deconstructable doesn’t effect the subject which is now separated to what might appear logically to have generated it, though in our case this reversed, logically or gramatologicaly, though not in the non history - pre history of the subjective phenomenon, the source of the text  becomes a instantiation which is hidden to the empty generative class and others which it creates,  which even generates itself, and as such can take part in a history of analysis etc. as well as safely  instantiating its subject, to the extent that the subject is allowed to be itself, regarding itself as an instantiation of its own life world not determined by external logics, grammar, rules bases etc. For instance in relation to its class which it generates and which is so a generative class itself, of itself and others.

 

 

The nature of this class and its supposed inheritance and types in the subjective post- theoretical text is reversed, however this in an anti histro-ontological sense must also at some point have been or is the case. The move from subject - object - subjects- is its product, and here the original subject's content is removed or hidden to a critical or hostile reader. It is therefore not the case of demanding specifics if this is only in order to remove them - modify etc. we have placed a special signification in the instant, and one we have said is problematic, and here formally problematic, one then cannot be  describable. Such descriptions are other objects, real objects, non problematic in form, in logic, in reality, in metaphysics, maybe, but our initial problematics form, here in this, can  derive a class, narrative etc.-  a generalized class, but not one capable  of producing   a critique of it, from some external and therefore illegality, or open it to illegal alteration etc, or even create it, as a text. The point here is the abstract nature of our subjects types of problematic.

 

The properties of these subjective classes, methods etc, is that they can have, and do have multiple different instances with their own life worlds unlike some universal overarching, and legitimizing, limiting , class or narrative i.e. a determinist object, typical of modernity.

 

 

 

 

this text now opens itself into a space which was already present,  and we do not decide on some object, even the impossibility of an object, this is not considered.  The text is distributed, is formed by the thought, and distributed by the thought, altered by the thought, in this way and not a formative critique of the thought, it does not formulate the thought, the thought persists as something undefined by the text, and so the text does not define even itself.

 

Now this de-ontologizes but as yet we have no subject , we borrow - an object, in our case 'art', and place it into our subject as the intention of the thoughts content not its intention. We can say more - that this resembles a problem, but one without a solution or the desire of a solution. One again can generalize a metaphysics of sorts from this, of the sort which changes itself into not just a multiplicity, but a process, a number of parallel events rather than a singularity.

we can regard history as being absent, as if it is present its present as something which prevents history.

 

 

 

The actuality, of this intention without an object, or objectivity, perhaps  is present as it changes, not in a state change, but rather in the sense of a changing state, one that is never static, and so never one, a none state, before it becomes useful, the activity of this intention, not its object its destination, but the word itself must be altered to reverse its direction to the changing nature it can hold or express, which it is given, to which it  pulls away from, doesn’t hold but handle, altering and   so is a good word to use here. We say it behaves eventually like an object, but we must not fail to engage even in the impossibility of the object, which we are pressured already to leave our original thought, that which made the art is removed, absented for something other, a thing of truth, and  of value. /or other such mythic / idealities- the whole materialist - determinist  value system is based on this fallacy,  the value of anything including the object itself, it is that there always has been the alternative to the production of the object of value, the uncompleted intention, the actuality of the act becoming something else, never being itself, (a denial of ontologisms ontology- leaving ontology static for a moment!- though perhaps we shouldn’t - firstly a denial  is used as an alternative which has to not see its other for a moment  in order to generate itself, into a being, which is both a thing and a becoming) which is to the word an act of freedom and creation, something new, a creation which continually creates itself, yet never achieves this, leaving the space for its and anything others, future. (time here can be thought of  the present’s movement towards not being here, without this failure of ontology and  existence  nothing would exist) the art act, this act represents an instantiation of this.

 and successfully now - the immediacy not its instantiated object - there is no object- It is both closed off on its own and yet produces, is the act of producing the next process, otherwise nothing including the art - would exist, art's production here is always guaranteed, but always objectless, still to gain a value, always possible.  What is produced is different- only by virtue of a conceptualizing it as an object, as such it can gain a value, and this is a description of something other than this, which is then open to deconstruction, philosophizing, critically evaluation and comodification etc.

 

 

 

 

On method- as  historically text structuralizes thought, the avoidance of thinking in a certain way becomes  the avoidance of writing  as representation,  our problem then is best expressed in writing, can only be expressed as both being complex, deferred, unstable, and present in its activity which leaves an unstable mark,  in writings uncertainty and complexity. This is not to engage in the meaning of writing  but the meaning of thought, the thinking of thought,  as an opened meaning of the prior graphical, objective thought, the problem of meaning is not the problem of knowing what one means, this knowledge is always a postori and closes the activity of thought, and so we  use meaning  in a way more than its  historical sense, keeping its historic sense but bringing to it the history of consciousness and its presence, of thought before the event, and not as yet some idea or episteme,  and specifically in cases where this involves the presence of ethical and aesthetic consciousness then this is what I will  call  art.

 

We then push words - with all they still have and are, into a space on which they need to work harder than before, we overload them now with our self,  in this creative, and not created space which is always new, we allow them to become creative, this  creation must also now be new, as we are, be new, the word must first uncreate itself to begin to express itself, and through this our self,  the presence of itself, first disappears, is disappearing, is a presence , this presence a disappearing of itself, before someone, me, names it, and so before I name anything, even myself.

 

 

 

(Lets write towards this, this referent, without violence that wishes to establish a permanence which prevents this.)

 

(The purpose of this is subordinate. Too simple to be pragmatic or symbolic on some other text, or thing. )

 

Writing has always been about something written or something other - not of itself, but of the referent of this presence. Not a description, words, or a description of itself, as text. Or what text is. What then is this referent, open, lacking in violence of presence, giving in to itself and anything other. This referent is that which denies itself to itself and so is the prime cause. That is in simple naming and complex metaphysics .

 

(Language's presence and permanence is  a presence, as is all objects, including art objects - even when they do not signify a referent they offer a pretence of objective presence , permanent presence. )

 

Is a thought reciting, or has it a dynamic before the confrontation with the idea of an object, before it can be referred to. And how is it to be referred to, how is it, its status to be treated, sustained, in the past it was convenient to replace it with a sign.  And this is not to recourse to emotive gestures, but complex dynamic systems, a language must be as subtle as this. We have written out simplistic objects and now we are re-writing writing.

There are two sources of instability, one logo-philosophical the other aesthetic-ethic, of consciousness. From the later we do not create or judge objects but create the spaces for itself, its presence in whatever form, or not.   This space has a structure which is ontologically missing, absent, not even deferred- or is it in anyway transcendental. It feels incomplete which may provoke an activity towards it which is destructive - and contrary to what is provoked. That is its representation must be in a shifting - a moving- which is possible only now in a certain linguistic light. Literature is fixed and so cannot move in this space. Philosophy destroys it - yet there is nothing philosophically mysterious, imaginary, arbitrary about it, its ethics are our ethics its aesthetic the same, of what could be called instability, the mutability of consciousness in the first case, its move towards something in the second, a move towards a lie, all texts lie.

 

The need to be positive imposes new tasks on words. One is certain of this incompleteness, because of the impossibility of completion, without completing something else which is then lost to us.

 

 

 

Reading Nietzsche as a paradigm for reading art as language- or art as text -etc.

 

Reading Nietzsche and relying on a reading, what reading is, in the sense of partial reading or to ask the question how could it be a  complete reading, and as to where the contradiction is, where the error is, there, not if any at all, or in here, by recourse to itself, not a recourse to Nietzsche’s, then one can ask, who or what is one reading, and how, and why. How does one deal with such supposed dual, or multiplicity of  readings, and potential readings. I'm not answering such a question, in any case a dealing with... is, if not impossible  certainly unlikely, so  we are left with writing?  Potentially difficult in its sense of motivation regarding the empty tautological space - spaces? which are provided. If as we say a contradiction occurs, which is wrong, we invoke a reading of language which might well reduce to either tautologies or contradictions, how then is our reading a reading of anything at all. So if we want to read anything, read in a different way, to a fixing on some contradiction whoever is writing or reading, but  to engaging with them, which is very much what I at least would wish to do, as for Nietzsche, the development of his apparent contradictions, though I have tried to point to these, I would not mind playing a further part in whatever activity might take place around them, though  this is perhaps a philosophical task, or a task of literary criticism..  for myself however their role is essential in both destabilizing the text, is part of a  programme of writing before the logical framework, which is perhaps philosophy, or the end of art, the root of the idea. Around this disruption, which is yet to have a static object to disrupt, this is a site which interests me. We arrive disrupted, confused, yet these words - like all , work backwards from an idea of objectivity- only in some senses-  which is an idea of language,  and logic. Which places us back with the unspeakable, empty, diseased view of philosophy, metaphysics and questions of art. Not at ease, this is though the artistic condition as a disease, unease, which is to be dealt with, hidden, not -solved by the  writing, as important,  whether it be good or bad, and  the same could be said of speech, yet both are obviously empty- in themselves. They too quickly replace the disease, the disruption with an empty promise. The text  disrupts the subject with its objectivity at  the cost of this subjective space, at the cost of the subject’s subject ,if this is declined,  refused, and silence not entered into,  there is something significant here, it is  the opening of the text to thought, and thought to the text. Opening up of thought to itself, like an embrace. The embrace that both signifies and is its own subject, we are left with the feeling which language now embraces before a textual problem a problem opens itself to the idea of problem, and the idea of problem to the problem itself, which is present. The referent. Now why is it that the problems idea is hostile towards its referent, is all language the same. Behind this inscribed hostility is a person, who wishes to naturally overpower.

 

 

 

 

Iconographical metaphysics - here, is a picture of a desired impossibility, it is opaque,  which in its desirability, unachangability is a metaphysical 'idea' or picture, the desire, the lack in metaphysics of the cosmos, a lack for the impossible, the incompleteness of that which cannot be complete, not of the created impossible idea, but that being is disrupted not by itself, is itself disruption, desire of desire in our terms,  the aporia of language, a priori, the limit to being and knowledge which is indefinable, that which  language attempts - is a non-existent ideality, which as  the immediate presentation of the present   avoids the nihilism of the eternal return of the same's  non-teleological  presence.

 

If the a priori of  this text is not  (significantly or is) its subject , as of all texts?  and the problematics relating to textuality, the nature of the text but not the texts subject and the subject has a content that normalized grammars will not see it, other than perhaps a set of statements which can appear contradictory, it is both behind and before the writing and not here present in whatever form we consider, is not here a consideration, here it is a  mistake, one of many ,'these are never articulated, in the subject, but if at all in the event, this event, which follows the falsification of content and meaning.' Art - or anything other than language, only if we consider that language stands outside its description,  or otherwise we need to re cast the text towards its subject at the expense of its guarantees given above, at the expense of being what it has become. This subject itself being free of such guarantees, or systems, or yet to establish any, its pre-established state is not a consequence of its yet to be, or may be, or becoming, or eventuality, if we consider consequences in a particular way, non historical associations for instance.  Lets try to be positive, my  difficulty of naming is that the arrival of a name legitimates certain moves, rather perhaps there should be a list of names, for no other reason other than a psychological economy, at this instance, which is itself economic , movement, opening, longing, waiting, yet to begin,  even in phenomenology the subjectivity of a certain presence which  appears before  the presence, its presence, preventing the beginning of phenomenology itself, until the activity of phenomenology or anything else takes place and objectifies - or attempts to, de subjectifies at least, fails to ground, yet provides a ground.   The subject is represented by a state, a feeling which is a presence which was once established as some movement towards an object, as here it is also. This writing in itself now becomes a movement towards the subjective subject and not a description , or critique, deconstruction etc of it. It then becomes of itself a subject which destabilizes itself, and then moves before this, stepping outside of its own constraints, if it could step, and here it attempts, falsely a signification.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But the call to the thing itself is at the same time directed against historicism, which gets lost in treatises about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of types of philosophical world views - as already noted, neither have we committed this time / structure to be linear, branching, dense or discrete etc. The answer to the pseudo-metaphysical question is not that we must revise these restrictions so as to provide for such cases, some poststructuralist semiotics as social semiotics are concerned with signifying practices in specific social contexts but we employ modalities in doing the former, of course, in what was called abstraction, in which we are aware of the difference between the modalities but we do not isolate them.

Much as we would make much of this agreement to write as an end in itself, even calling it one of the few unanimous decisions we took, and given the above analysis of the conclusion of  transcendental deduction, which demonstrates that all synthesis is subject to the categories, it is puzzling to find for instance Kant claiming that the unity of formal intuition precedes all concepts, yet presupposes a synthesis. In the (new) Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes all concepts, although it indeed presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, but through which all concepts first become possible.  We have little interest in modern metaphysics which regards itself with respect to the new  absolutes of foundationialism and tries by means of this, its own grounding, to integrate the other sciences , philosphies etc. as a pre-ontological knowledge according to its own standards of truth; or the opposite case,  the modern philosophies, theories etc which makes of themselves  absolute foundations and, if need be, appropriates elements of metaphysics according to its own methodology by this process the whole as such, surveying its entire content, itself emerges out of this wealth wherein its process of reflection seemed to be lost.

 

In the light of such conclusions, our  question is not fundamentally about the certainty of knowledge, signs, symbols, speech and writing on the basis of the, states, affections and what holds for consciousness, that holds here for so called subjective existence in general. On the contrary, we understand ideas primarily in the act of using them; reflective, theoretical awareness of them as distinct, extant things which develop from these, after all,  would be quite possible in view of the difficulty of effecting a transition from metaphysics to another kind of thinking. It is often very difficult to be able to decide what predicates are to be taken as primitives and which are to be defined via suitable nominal definitions outside of metaphysics yet inside art, nothing like what is called the explanation of the manner in which a priori concepts which can relate to objects.

 

Connections with intuitionistic’s were noticed early on and toposes are still used to investigate models of various aspects of intuitionis, instead of the inner activity and self, movement of its own actual intention, such a simple determination of direct intuition, Anschauung  which means here sense, knowledge  is predicated in accordance with a superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is a false construction. There has been a strong though by no means unanimous trend in  development of such conceptualism, when new techniques for understanding art were supposedly being developed and that understanding itself was being transformed! (sic) Kant described what this in effect was as the relationship between the critique of reason and the science of metaphysics which has to be grounded anew by means of the concept of transcendental philosophy,  I would not wish to use the title transcendental with relation to knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects, Kant did not demand that one completely do without these instruments in philosophical knowledge, but that one should become aware of their specific difference of performance in the respective knowledge of the object itself - and this would prove useful in particular, it will be useful to see whether this sort of theisis or objection  towards a theoretical positioning is involved in anything which would follow from the truth the universality of any logical set of events as practiced by the phenomenologist qua artist - non conceptually, from the very beginning the universality in which he or she becomes the totality of his/her practice? -  processes bring about objects not only as a  thematic of the individual processes of intentionalities and thereby discloses its noematic components; it further directs itself on the intentions of the activity, which lies in both the history and programme of conceptual art towards this  relative presence.  Similarly, because of this external and historical - instituitional hostility towards such structures we have here now something under such a risk - even towards the  empirical research and deductive - analytic  logics of post -modernity in general.

 

The fundamental meaning of exactness in all of this lies in its being founded on an a priori formal system where each part unfolded in a specific act which can through praxis produce theory similar to general theories elsewhere - we see talk of theories of ethics etc. theories  of  pure concept, theory of idea, etc for a hermeneutics described as a condition, at the outset as the unbreachable basis for its method, that can avoid problems - an alienation between the physical and the natural as an instance.. (Looking at the arguments in the foregoing paragraphs what legitimates the value judgements if they relate to old teleological requirements or tendencies - such primitives in logic which rested on the idea that if any two sentences mean the same, then they are about the same things- and this is in effect challenged.) In contrast to these sets codes we may be forced by some considerations to adopting non codes - structurally simpler objects which critically are pushed to the point of being empty - empty of symbolic meaning but not of some empirical concept - which then can generate a basic for semotics etc. , originally - like in history not employing standard conventions and formulas , so they can generate cliches and stereotypes brought to stand in being called to cast itself as self in one of its possibilities of existing and committing itself to a draft of itself .

 

The empirical does not allow for the evaluation of normative claims especially if its own is a separate point from the critique of the general importance of certainty and control in The New Art, thus, even though Derrida can say that diffrance is the condition of possibility for presence, he will not permit this term to be recuperated and thence become the site of origin itself - this has an obvious importance to us here. Now how do things stand in relation to this subjectivity? Modern theories of self, organization phenomena have several roots which did look for control hierarchies, but we quickly see more complex behavior that opposed the reductionism of the modern, universal as metaphysics, distinguishing itself from the traditional principles first fundamentally in regard to this methodology- if it should so be called. It recognizes its self, a reflective function  of its self, examination  for the relative realization of the correlative practical idea of sense, whose structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, it recognizes its self, reflective function for the relative realization of the correlative practical idea of a second sense, whose structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, namely as one consciously and purposively directed towards this absolute idea.

 

From premises of that kind it is or might be concluded that real thought in fact took other forms and was governed by other laws than those that this current logic considered the sole determinations of intention. For example, on one reading of the following sentences. 

1:Theory is a victim especially of this misunderstanding because, apart from refusing to shift from the metaphysics of subjectivity to a consideration of  being as being, it adamantly insists on a fundamental drafting of being as egoistic, ie as an egoistic subject, into which it then introduces the imperative, absolute ethics of the other.

2: Everything that was discussible has been discussed; this is true is no longer

in order to express the occurrence of events, but we use events  to express that events occurs over time.

 

 

But this- either - is not enough, and such a definition/s is merely nominal, which do you like most, which enjoys a clear syntax and a precise semantics compared to some existing representative reified temporal systems such as those of the following analysis which would have to thoroughly investigate as claims to have disentangled logic from ontology, an investigation I’m unequipped to carry out at this point. All imaginative synthesis is not subject to theory- or theory of theories, and this presumably includes whatever synthetic components are inherent in mere thought - or what we could call anticipation- regarding internal categories, we are growing increasingly aware that the top layer is a context which is extremely difficult to handle, roughly speaking a model of a theory may be defined and used as a possible realization in which all valid sentences of the theory are satisfied and a possible realization of the theory is an entity of the appropriate set theoretical structure etc. but now we find that this in our case simply wont do. The definiteness and anaphoricness of it in induces a sort of familiarity effect in which some absence in a thing that permits it to be supplemented, has the course to a replaced refinement, an improvement, the warding off anomalies, with praxis, the strong possibility of confusion outside, contradiction as perceived internally, living with the difficulties of the attempts to stucture such events could be regarded as a very  speculative psychological activity - whereas it is not yet in such a category - as it is what it is to mean, as for grammar for instance  or the formal elements, it refers us to the articulation of categories, and therefore to the understanding, which will be no doubt treated  of only later in nuerous levels and categories, and perhaps most likely in ignoring the  reasons for a belief being  rejected -when any of the following conditions are met - we could regard this as some kind of non conclusive success. This means that the ideas in theories gain some propetries - only afterwards - and so a postori generate the physical thing, in itself - and then ideas such that in Kant that it  was beyond knowledge, unknowable- in itself.

To think abstractly then meant to be enslaved by the force of current catchphrases and clichs, of one, sided, empty definitions, of instituitions and sicial constructs meant to see in real, sensuously intuited things only an insignificant part of their real content, only such determinations of them as were already jelled in others consciousness and functioned there as ready made stereotypes, these paradigms of art theory supported the intent to examine art as the context of art- and in effect became an attempt - at a final closure on theory..

 

A great deal of work has been done to study how the probabilistic inferences, much of which is initiated in conceptual art itself, i.e. as for something not philosophy even strictly speaking,  and that is not a science though which in cerain latter stages attempted to borrow from the philosophy of science a valid methodology- to  illustrate the issues of defining this ontology, to consider the praxis that serves mostly as a pretext for shutting down the theoretical critique that transformative praxis would require in the latter eventualities. If one does not understand this initial transformation of the concepts of a text, then we necessarily come back to the question of how subjects actually select attributes of the activity to apply to these texts in their extension and evaluation -  we will, I think, beg no questions if we simply assume that an adequate conceptual framework must employ some system of the sort indicated above to such temporally qualified and singular statements, for example, it is expressed  early in art and language that there was a kind of extension and so borrowing of a synthetic framework as as ideology, moreover, the deflationary theories of falsity that needed then to be considered - motivated in large part by classical logic - produced more problems than the objects they were brought in to clarify, or in many cases exclude. What we know, or what we would know if it were simply a question here of something to know, is that there has never been, never will be, a unique definition, object, paradigm etc. of course, of the kind of critical reflection and tolerance for conflict in an important start to uncovering the ways that we act and think that ignores our dependence on genuine communication - if it took place. This ignoring is a token for a complex activity of analysis perhaps best regarded from other disciplines. We have moved along the lines of the synthetic but in post-modernity we have a larger scope.

 

 

The synthetic movement in Kantian terms provides some basis for a legitimacy in the creative activity not asd some objective historicy but as some kind of unity in the Transcendental Aesthetic and that this was attributed to sensibility, although in fact it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the phenomenal  senses and that as synthetic constructs it creates an ontological question regarding an analysis of its  accounts which require in the analyses of  it’s  possibility that certain propositions exist, notably, singular propositions and, in particular,  propositions that dont exist in fact but would exist if certain individuals did, as would be the case through a clarification of the ambiguity of meaning in the nature of a synthetic movement or moment - before hand - which has historically been called the phenomenologically of pure conscious subjectivity, we can understand on the deepest of grounds the historical invincibility of psychologism - yet see how such complex situations are factual as a non sigular act of syntheisis in  experience. Some historians who feel, however, that there is a heuristic reason for presenting these ideas as well, to the abstract concrete distinction of specific function found it easier to start from scratch and write new formalities- favoured texts which drew attention to their constructedness and to the processes involved in their construction and this pragamatically appears at first sight something of a better descriptive move. For such an architectonic reading it would doubtless be best to consult here these  matters of the semantics of my text, and analysis of the need for a third synthesis, again following Kant closely we cannot recognize a recurring representation as the same representation unless we have a synthesis for seeing the representation as the same, inventing existential graphs and introducing rules of inference that depend only on the operations of copying, erasing, and combining - this gets conceived of as a relation of extant representations to extant things, to the extent that our cognitive being uses this framework correctly and accurately, it takes the place of the present.  This time, a reading of the connotations of the text would confirm the reading of its descriptions; I have just indicated the principle of this reading, and should point out that this is obviously another move away from the synthetic activity with which we begin. In the absence of such an account, the philosophical significance of the contrast remains uncertain and an annotation never has a reference in both the concept of philosophical experience that both challenges Kants distinction and rejects Hegels constructions in the course of their investigations must proceed beyond physical facts and mathematical methods; such theorization is one of the basis of scientific explanation, once scientific skepticism is focused on it, Platonism is hard to maintain - but that is not again now our problem, its here to demonstrate the pragmatic effectiveness of such forms as dialectic closure, of such sets of answers. So creativity is seen to offer not only a validation for activity but for a methodology of activity itself - the result of such a search  or seaches for new theories and hypotheses  in the presence of the production of events, moves which appear whenever a candidate for an anomalous example comes up has to the mainstream been to choose representations which were already familiar and now through constant reuse over some thirty years have come to feel natural and unmediated, and can even shape what we accept as reality at least within a genre, provisionally, however, one might define such an activity as a  metaphysical activity  as that form of thinking which fails to investigate the intelligible structures or principles which underlie the activity and its objects and which determine its activity as now being far too naïve yet still increadably adaept at production. Heidegger for instance must have recognized this deficiency, since the works that immediately follow Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics deal with freedom with increasing directness and a kind of social critique was generated as a side effect of such a philosophical activity. The intuition is that such production of hypotheses is systematically unconfirmable and undisconfirmable, of course instituitions have always been very robust  and able as a process provide images telelogy and logic as a technological solution to bridging the gap between the ogjcetives of social activity and the synthetic event including the use of these actual terms and texts in the form of metaphor, including metaphors of space have mediated an imaginary constitution of society, indeed, the two dogmas, the belief in the intelligibility of the analytic, synthetic distinction and the belief that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all, the very version what it is about that escapes understanding is objectively preserved not only because of the criteria that a paradigm must satisfy in the very early stages such as preserving problem, solving the solving anomalies that devolped from the dialectical problems of such activities to lead to the solution as  the objectivity of criteria that remain.

 

 

There was in all this a particular emphasis on a recent break with  argumentative antipsychologism intraditional transcendental philosophy, but nowhere were the objections deeply and firmly enough based, nor did those who explored the evidence see conceptually that the transcendental must evidently go back to conscious experience  and on this ground through actual descriptive, analytic and eidetic work, a radical clarification of all its special forms found in early exploritative texts.

 

(On Burn, Ian: The Role of Language 1991.)

 

Like all the other categories, also the process of writing - of moves in conceptual art -  its typical structures failed to locate an ontology, the writing, therefore, in order to be what it is, must be able to function in the absence of both general metaphysics and ontologies in particular and every empirically determined structure in general.

 

Consider, for instance, a non, modal quantifier claim and we are thereby led to explicate the relation of one to the other in order not to secure the place of metaphysics, we must enquire as to how this surpassing to the supersensuous could be accomplished,  only the occurrence or revelation of the text to be examined, its social semioticians that acknowledge that not all realities are equal, and are interested in texts as sites of struggle in which realities are contested- can speculation on perception be reformulated as a theory of intentionality that can yet reveal itself- and become something like an object itself. Heidegger’s analyses this synthesis in the mode of apprehension as having a double character, take this position and all feelings for this one, and then take all concepts and their objects and  also all thought for the creation of such texts for example, and the set here is a text is defined as the set of problems where the instances can not  be directly checked  - from the forms and possibilities of these texts - and their intentions which before being objectified cannot be enumerated it becomes clear that what is meant in this description is not only a conception of the context of  things but at the same time an interpretation of the sense and purpose of the text that we attempt to create. Coming at this all from another angle, how is one to decide whether a particular feature is necessary or contingent, since we have constantly failed to find only one, and so we cannot fall back on the simplest way to test a claim to necessity, i.e. that it occurs as  an idea that can be neither metaphysics nor science.

 

Some of the paradigms of abstractness are non spatiotemporal in a straightforward sense, if one is not a substantivalist about space and or time, one can describe the abstraction as invoking the idea of ever thinner layers of the bounded entity….. thus the category differs from the notion, in that the notion gets its unity from mere logical reflection, while categories have as their content a synthetic unity. Though elsewhere - in Heidegger - the ontological erasure in metaphysics remains, and a hope for naturalistic accounts of knowledge, language, consciousness, intellect, etc. in determining intention as presence,  presence of the present event -  present  in the form before the object, or self-presence of the present being in the form of self-consciousness,  metaphysics could only consider the sign as a passage, a place of passage, between two moments of presence, the provisional reference from one presence to the other, and so is not really very suitable here.

 

The ‘true to the Western tradition idea’ that controls not only in theory, but in practice in the principle of its practice the relationships between objects and writing, theory and praxis…. does not recognise in the latter more than a narrow and derivative function-  such complex parallism avoids the lack of dimensionalities of logic and all of these dimensions are determined in accordance with the horizon and require a disclosure of the horizon and of the levels and dimensions of sense that are not made clear through this disclosure, for interactions of the lexical and conceptual systems in every natural language has a well organized lexical and syntactic system- here Kant is quite explicit that he found his categories of the understanding by an examination of his own judgments, they were what he saw to be entailed in the logical forms of judgment - and it is not in passing that we go back to this point of judgement. In practice there is no limit to the historical ideas of existence, possibilities of access and modes of interpretation of histories are themselves diverse, varying in different historical circumstances. Similar remarks apply to theory, except that they expresses themselves as a kind of  universal quantifier, for example, we may say that, in knowledge, the intentional component is belief, by which knowledge itself is a case of intentionality.- as we are accustomed to say, we are able to think something about it - and as previously indicated, these are in  the causal event and point of application of the effectual event different points, the spanning of which is through some action at a distance- non local action when transformed from event causation into an equivalent agent causation becomes a physico-social action- which maybe is defacto the case but need not neccesaryily be what is wanted in the first place here, this idea is repeated elsewhere- since if texts themselves are considered to rest on second order codes the first order codes being those in which language consists, this book could offer the rough draft of a third order code, destined to insure the reciprocal possibility of third order texts- this questioning thinks the question of the texts- of their presence and production  a question that is essentially misleading and in its manifold meanings is still not mastered! but what remains unthought in the matter of philosophy as well as in this, is method, others are more concerned with correctly presenting ideas than subjecting them to doubt, look at this in the light of the way most art ‘shows’ are ‘presented’.

 

The type token distinction in relation to signs is important in semiotic terms to much of the above- not as an absolute property of the sign vehicle but only insofar as it matters on any given occasion for particular purposes to those involved in using the sign so the recent interest in anaphora is largely an interest in finding a semantic theory for problematic anaphora- but our inquiry concerning theses intentions conflict with the main problems within positivisms overly exclusive attention to empirical observation and logical validity and conceptions immediately brought about constructive shifts in the whole system of logic.

We may formulate our concern, then, as follows, is there anything in the claim to mention this distinction leads us to discuss certain established ideas that usually come to notice in this connection - the first problem raises the question what exactly is involved in interpreting which refers to the abstract system of rules and conventions of a signifying system, is it independent of, and pre-exists as individual and subjective objects for their self determination,  knowledge which enables us to understand in our ordinary comprehension something of them which is essentially false, /their objectivities/ we attend to this activity only as one of many - as a particular event amongst others and so no attention to this activity - or rather an oversion to this and its character - or more generally a complete indefifference is found but here no longer is attention  required - this being as such, that is, to its character as  being- is sufficent.. If this formulation is adopted, then it is clear that the thesis is not one of physicalism and it may well be viewed as a broad version of the thesis of logical behaviorism, and if this is taken as granted, then logical behaviorism entails this formulation of the thesis of physicalism. Note that I focus not just on knowledge, transfer, etc. which I think  focuses on the intention but on a type of knowledge, including now outside this semiotic model - of art- of Universals-  indeed the apparent effect of our discussion of justification is to at once raise anew and seriously aggravate the classical ideas of theory  or, perhaps better, one amongst the classical problems as a whole as theoretical pluralism ought to be not only the stance of the position of an adequate textuality given a lot of possibilities to build opposites, logic, grammar, semantics, word games, phonetics, writing, gestures etc and since all knowledge is essentially intuition, and all thought might ultimately relate to intuition, this ground must itself be an intuition.

 

If we use the test for technical terms suggested by discussion, then we run into obstacles in trying even to establish the connection, a programme etc even though at a semantic level, however, there are profound differences in meaning and intention general logic only deals with the function of thought as unification, without regard for relation to objects, intentions etc. and for instance - to answer a specific criticism- theories are regularly rejected, if a paradigm must somehow supply such criteria, then this is clearly an extension of meaning. Coherence theorists might answer this question by saying that  what is believed, is believed is true - this must here, is, however, the problem with the concept of the theory in itself, which lies in its presupposition that there is some infinite intuition that knows things as they are in themselves, for if we do not accept the presupposition of an absolute intuition that first produces the thing, that is, the presupposition of that concept of theory, in the sense of the produced text, that did not develope out of ontology, then we also cannot accept the concept of the theory in itself here- this reading of the category of whole, however fundamental, it cannot be generalized to any other ontological types of whole- but what it shows itself of itself in the openness of the truth of this text and I notice also that this distinction is only of pragmatic or mnemonic value; the formal definition for the sense to ask of any such object, anyway without the problematics of art there would be no art.

 

One reaction is, of course, simply to regard this as evidence that any identification of the requisite sort is hopeless, the language  maybe defined just like the language of the predicate calculus with identity, with additional clauses in the definition of a formula: whatever is a formula, so is - or the point of this whole thing,  a demonstration of a set of problems: it shows, but doesnt necessarily say - and this distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained and the scope of the reader who could so trivialize some of the problems in the previous paragraph.

Kants treatment of the relationship of the pure imagination to apperception, and of both to the understanding, contains the same ambiguity as to the primordiality as we find in this so we see an apparently natural use made of those methodical aids, definitions, axioms and proofs, which in Kants opinion are primary and permissible  only in mathematics- but which can be extended into any tautological structures- and this of course raises foundational themes in art and language- though we are no longer either caught or that concerned in such tautologies as foundations. .

 

This is a problem for most critical theorists: in linking powerful interests with particular institutions or customs they rarely explicate ethical criteria or guidelines on which the critiques are based, in conformity with this usage, all non philosophical activities have as their theme as some of these sentences show which show how to make context, dependent references, a rigorous definition, which would have to be gained in another way, nevertheless, the idea involved remains, reappearing in the form of the recurring theme that abstraction is falsification, and in this form is central to this logic and this metaphysics - if they were supposed, but the matter as such which they are to present is the same, although it is experienced in different ways, giving reasons for actions is explaining themselves and this is a form of causal explanation, this complexity, which at times is presented as a simple homology of attributes, would mean that there are always more than interpretive questions at stake. This presence - intention - text - becomes not a given metaphysical premise, but precisely the object of explanation itself.

 

 

 

 

Any criticism  which serves to illustrate a broad form of essentialist argument, common to much essentialist work, which might justifiably be attributed to the present is not identical with itself, for example Heidegger’s claim is that by giving shape to our historical understanding of what is  metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what anything is, including then this - however for another instance in our ordinary language but also in philosophical texts the terms are never of equal value - we might express this by saying that someone who endorses the correspondence intuition so understood would endorse these propositions- now the problem with this is that, when we combine it with any kind of  deflationary theory, or at least with a necessary version of that theory, we can derive something that is plainly false in terms of the culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns. Any form is described by the attributes of all its potential contexts.

 

Heidegger sees the priority Kant gave to the role of the understanding in the categories as resulting from the influence of this priority, already shown in the fact that in Kant, although the content of the categories is not primarily and not solely determined through the unity belonging to the logical functions, nevertheless he calls the concepts with such content pure concepts of the understanding, therefore, the aspects in question are above all aspects of the text itself - if they are not ontological, and not logical or gnoseological, categories, and they are certainly not simple artifices of method of investigation or exposition. This is not necessarily ground for abandoning models, these theoretical writings, as attempts at coherent argument and in the specific way they fail, offer some insight into the unique subjectivity of the Conceptualist.  This is not so far from the scientific doctrine of operationalism, that every physical object or quantity is defined by our procedures for observing or measuring, though this is not so strictly what is meant as what was said earlier; it may be of some use as it may be easier to follow, but then we need to consider just what is at stake here.

It does not seem plausible to hold that this statement  if true  describes the world in the direct, simple sort of way in which a statement cannot, this reflection does not keep us to pure reflection; for, in being taken, as belonging really to the text in question, reflection is linked to experience of the intrinsic text itself. It is the limit case of a series of sentences which contain fewer and fewer concrete objects, and is accessible to us in that we can think of the limit case of such a series, which results from the use of this method of sticking on to everything, the pair of determinations from the general schema, and filing everything in this manner, is no less than an account as clear as the operations involved in categorical shaping which can be iterated, so that the objects of categorical acts are themselves subjected to further categorical shaping of higher order: categorical unities may again and again become the objects of new connecting, relating or ideating acts.  And though Goldman argues for this view of knowledge on primarily a priori grounds- e.g. by considering how well it captures our intuitive classifications of beliefs as cases of knowledge or not, the theory itself gives these claims, in turn, consolidates and extends the historiographic and social, theoretical arguments already canvassed. This language is not simply discreet and defensive, for instance in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, Heidegger claims that the ontotheological distinction had already been brought together implicitly in Plato’s doctrine of the ideas.

 

 

 

With this we are now confronted by the problem of the basic articulation of this text, the question of the necessary belonging, together of whatness and way of requiring, and of the belonging of the two of them in their unity to the idea of intentions in general. Moreover, how now did this prohibition of aesthetic sensibility, or aisthesis, mark the productive output of Conceptual Art for grammatical and rhetorical meaning. Now it cannot be identical with other analylitic activities, and one may well not be able to assign a priority of meaning- it might be said we perceive to familiarize, lets compare this to modern philosophy, the positivist and empiricist view of the proper task of reason, which is also held more or less by analytical philosophers, asserts that metaphysics has always been characterized by a synthetic view of reason, so we might be in danger of going metaphysics? There have been at least two main lines of work around all this - and what you get is a list of other signifiers and its conservation during the activity, regarded as a real phenomenon, this is precisely because attempts, to a certain extent, and even though in principle and in the last analysis are seen as legitimate are in some cases - this particular case- impossible, and impossible for essential reasons, to reassemble in the different directions in which I have been able to utilize what I would call provisionally the word or concept, or rather to let it impose itself, the fact that such a problematic and such a method could remain completely hidden is due to the essential peculiarity of conscious intentionality itself, other than directed to and involved with some object that is already given to it. For this can be done by describing their mode of producing knowledge it  then becomes all the more ideological and dogmatic - it happens, in our culture, and probably in most, that not only do we repeat these thematic patterns, or formations, again and again in each text, merely embroidering on the details, we also do so from one text or discourse event to another. The existential has become the apophantical and  marks the movement of this unfolding, what the epochs shows us clearly, however, is that the intention is the one in whose work process - the apperception of being, standing within the universal- and that which acquires and maintains its sense of being- is lost or given up to philosophy - metaphysics and the pseduononimous writings- but which now hides itself. There is an overwhelming ignorance as a general backdrop to which we cannot enage with.  

 

 

Due to the manner in which it thinks of beings, metaphysics almost seems to be, without knowing it, the barrier which keeps us from the original involvement with the theory in these terms, we see that the points of indeterminacy of an object depend on the position of the word, the text, then before or after the word as something definite, we do not single out, or use this as a critique or a methodology or better an intentionality that we already had,   this itself, is now not as it was, an imaging, a means of producing a  set of propositions,  even according to the principles of dialectical logic, that which is cannot be true, (The new paradigm must preserve a large part of the problem solving ability that has accrued under the older paradigm’s work) as the picturing dimension of truth represents also the  value of the distinction between factual or empirical truths and other varieties of truth, a distinction which vanishes in the semantic conception of truth, because of the extremely brief presentation of the schematism, since it is the function of the imagination to bring the manifold into an image, the pure productive imagination brings the pure manifold of time into a pure, unified image. For example, when I look at a thing actively, in experiencing I explicate it, I comprehend and judge it, and so on.